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Abstract
The majority of innovations are developed by multi-sector firms. The knowledge needed to
invent new products is more easily adapted from some sectors than from others. We study this
network of knowledge linkages between sectors and its impact on firm innovation and aggregate
growth. We first document a set of sectoral-level and firm-level observations on knowledge
applicability and firms’ multi-sector patenting behavior. We then develop a general equilibrium
model of firm innovation in which inter-sectoral knowledge linkages determine the set of sectors
a firm chooses to innovate in and how much R&D to invest in each sector. It captures how
firms evolve in the technology space, accounts for cross-sector differences in R&D intensity, and
describes an aggregate model of technological change. The model matches new observations as
demonstrated by simulation. It also yields new insights regarding the mechanism through which
sectoral fixed costs of R&D affect growth.
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1 Introduction
Innovation hardly ever takes place in isolation. Technologies depend upon one another, yet vary
substantially in their applicability. Some innovations, such as the electric motor, create applicable
knowledge that can be easily adapted to develop new products in a vast range of sectors; while
others introduce knowledge that is limited in its scope of application. The interconnections between
different technologies and the stark contrasts in their future impact have long been recognized by
economic historians (e.g. David, 1991; Rosenberg, 1982; Landes, 1969). The majority of theoretical
works on endogenous growth, however, tend to treat innovations in different technologies as isolated
and equally influential.1
Empirical evidence based on patent citations suggests that knowledge spillovers vary substan-
tially across sectors and are highly significant. More than half of patent citations are made between
distinct technology categories, with some technologies contributing more knowledge to innovations
in the entire economy than others.2 In addition, inspecting the firm patenting data reveals the
importance of multi-sector firm innovations: 42% of patenting firms innovate in more than one
technological area, accounting for 96% of patents in the economy. These are the firms which are
able to internalize knowledge spillovers across sectors.
The questions are: How do firms decide on what kinds of technologies to develop, and in
which sectors to apply their existing knowledge and grow their business? How do technologies
progress from one sector to another? And ultimately, what are the aggregate growth implications
of technological diversification of firms? The efficacy of government policies directed at stimulating
innovations in certain sectors hinges on a better understanding of the above questions. Addressing
these questions requires a structural framework that integrates micro empirical evidence into a
macro-growth model with important heterogeneities across firms and sectors.
This paper therefore pursues two goals. First, we document several novel observations that
motivate our research. Technology interconnections are conceptual and difficult to measure. We
handle this empirical challenge by first constructing a “technology network”, which builds on the
patent citation network linking the knowledge receiving and contributing sectors. We then propose
a sector-specific measure of technology applicability using the method developed in the network lit-
1Notable exceptions include a body of work on General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) (e.g. Jovanovic and
Rousseau, 2005; Helpman, 1998; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). Differently from these studies, our paper focuses
on the impact of technology linkages on firm innovation and aggregate growth. The associated notion of technology
applicability is related to, but distinct from, the concept of generality of purpose of technologies.
2This is based on 428 technology classes (U.S. Patent Classification System) provided by U.S. Patent and Trade
Office for the period 1976-2006. The share becomes even higher when using more disaggregated classifications.
Previous empirical studies using other types of data also point to the importance of cross-sector knowledge spillovers.
For example, using R&D investment data Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) find that knowledge spillovers across five high-
tech industries are substantial and highly heterogeneous. The survey study by Wieser (2005) finds that spillovers
between sectors are more important than those within sectors when evaluating both the social and private return of
R&D.
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erature.3 The method establishes a particular hierarchy in the technology network that is amenable
to empirical explorations. Combining this measure with firm R&D/patenting data, we document
in Section 2 the following observations: (1) at the sector level technology applicability helps to
explain the persistent variations in R&D intensity across sectors; (2) at the firm level more inno-
vative firms—with larger patent stock and patent scope—concentrate more in highly applicable
technologies; (3) as firms grow, they gradually enter less applicable, less connected technologies;
and (4) firms with a larger share of highly applicable knowledge subsequently innovate faster.
The second objective is to develop a general equilibrium model of multi-sector firm innovation to
explain these observations and to draw aggregate implications. The framework extends the leading
growth models of firms R&D and patenting (such as Klette and Kortum, 2004) into a multi-
sector environment. Relative to the existing studies, our framework emphasizes two new features:
heterogeneous intersectoral knowledge linkages which affect firms’ cross-sector R&D allocation; and
idiosyncratic fixed costs of innovation which act as barriers to diversification and induce sequential
entry of firms into different sectors.4 Despite the multiple degrees of heterogeneity (at the sector-
level, sector-pair-level and firm-level), the model is tractable and allows for closed-form equilibrium
characterizations. The model captures how firms evolve in the technology space, and describes
how knowledge accumulates in different sectors and in the aggregate economy. It relates growth to
cross-sector knowledge circulation and R&D allocation, and yields new insight into the effects of
barriers to diversification (sectoral fixed costs) on growth. When simulated using a large panel of
firms innovating in different sectors, our model is able to reproduce each of the new facts above.
In the model, firms invent new products by adapting prior knowledge in various sectors through
R&D. Applicable technologies enhance the innovational productivity of R&D and contribute to a
sequence of innovations in many sectors. In adapting prior knowledge, firms can utilize their own
private knowledge, public knowledge or obtain licenses to use other firms’ private knowledge in
various sectors which is subject to an absorption cost. The latter takes place in an efficient and
competitive licensing market. Specifically, should any firm decide not to innovate in sector i in one
period, it can—and finds it optimal in equilibrium to—license the application rights of its prior
knowledge of sector j to other innovating firms in sector i during that period, assuming perfect
intellectual property rights protection.
In order to conduct research in any given sector, a firm has to pay a period-by-period idiosyn-
cratic fixed cost. The fixed cost of innovation leads to increasing return to knowledge capital,
generating demand from innovating firms to acquire additional related knowledge in the licensing
market. The equilibrium licensing fees that clear the market thus reflect the “application value”
3We focus on the “deep” knowledge linkages between technologies which are due to intrinsic characteristics of
technologies and do not vary over time. In some sense, it takes the view of Nelson and Winter (1977) that “innovations
follow ‘natural trajectories’ that have a technological or scientific rationale rather than being fine tuned to changes
in demand and cost conditions.” For this reason, we summarize citations made to (and from) patents that belong to
the same technology class over thirty years to form the technology network.
4We note that throughout the paper, entry and exit refer to innovating or not in a particular sector.
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of the source knowledge j in innovating in sector i. The existence of knowledge licensing market
thus allows all knowledge to be utilized in equilibrium, either by its original inventor or by other
firms that have acquired its application rights. Therefore, the equilibrium value associated with
knowledge capital in sector j is no longer just determined by the profit it generates in its own
sector as in conventional models, but also depends on its application value in all sectors. Higher
application value attracts firms to invest in R&D in that sector. This explains why technology ap-
plicability helps to understand cross-sector differences in R&D intensity as documented in Section
2 (Observation 1).
The sectoral fixed costs also make research in multiple sectors a self-selection process: a firm
develops new products in sectors where it can most efficiently utilize its existing range of knowledge.
This explains the empirical observations that firms conducting research in multiple areas are more
likely to concentrate in highly applicable technologies (Observation 2), because they are better
at internalizing inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers and thus have stronger incentive to innovate in
these sectors.
Although high applicability attracts firms to invest intensively in R&D in the “central” sectors,
the model also suggests a counteracting force: the fierce competition in these sectors, as the compo-
sition of firms in different sectors is endogenous and ultimately determined by knowledge linkages.
A firm would only conduct research in a sector if its knowledge is applicable enough to generate a
larger expected value than the fixed cost. Therefore, as firms grow and accumulate more private
knowledge in related sectors, they can afford to expand into “peripheral” technologies with lower
applicability but allowing them larger market shares (Observation 3). The trade-off between inno-
vational applicability and product market competition—which is at the heart of the R&D resource
allocation mechanism in the economy—leads to a stable distribution of firms across sectors and a
stable relative sector size on the balanced growth path.
Innovation by its nature is highly uncertain. In the model we assume that firms face two types
of uncertainty every period: idiosyncratic risks to the success of R&D and idiosyncratic risks to
its fixed costs of research in individual sectors. Therefore, although the underlying inter-sectoral
linkages dictate that firms generally start from central sectors and gradually venture into periphery,
not all firms follow the same sequence of sectoral entry. In any given sector, incumbents innovate,
expanding their sizes as they create new varieties and knowledge, and pause or stop innovating after
experiencing a sequence of adverse R&D shocks or high fixed costs. In addition, potential innovators
enter if they have accumulated enough knowledge capital—either by creating its own knowledge
or by acquiring external knowledge—in related sectors. This process endogenously generates a
distribution of firm size in each sector, converging to a Pareto distribution in the upper tail, in line
with existing empirical findings of firm size distribution.5
5Firm or establishment-level data show that firm size distributions within narrowly defined sectors and within the
overall economy are widely dispersed and follow a Pareto distribution, as documented in Axtell (2001), Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright (2007) and Luttmer (2007).
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Not only a firm’s R&D allocation across sectors but also its future growth is path-dependent.
As the firm moves through the technology space, the scope and applicability of its knowledge
change, and so do the opportunities to innovate, profit and grow in related sectors. The model
predicts that conditional on the size and scope of knowledge stock firms with a larger share of
applicable technologies tend to innovate faster, particularly by expanding into connected new sectors
(Observation 4).
Lastly, at the aggregate level the model yields new insights regarding the mechanism through
which sectoral fixed costs reduce growth in the presence of inter-sectoral knowledge linkages. As
mentioned earlier, in the process of adapting the acquired external knowledge the firm faces an ab-
sorption cost such that only a fraction of the external knowledge is effectively utilized. Therefore,
the market application value of any given knowledge is always lower than its internal application
value. Higher absorption costs thus decrease the equilibrium value of knowledge and lower firms’
incentive to invest in R&D. In addition, we assume that the higher the ratio of external knowledge
to in-house knowledge, the lower the absorption rate. Therefore, raising sectoral fixed costs de-
creases the fraction of firms that innovate in multiple sectors and internalize cross-sector spillovers
by themselves, increasing the external-to-own knowledge ratio in the economy. Consequently, less
knowledge would be effectively absorbed and utilized in the economy, generating a negative “knowl-
edge underutilization effect” on growth. Moreover, increasing the idiosyncratic uncertainty to the
fixed costs leads to more randomness in allocation of R&D resources across sectors, as opposed to
allocation according to fundamental knowledge linkages and firms’ prior knowledge. This generates
an additional negative “R&D misallocation effect” on growth.
Related Literature Our paper builds on Klette and Kortum (2004) (henceforth, KK) type of
models, which connect growth theories with findings from firm-level and sectoral-level studies of
innovation. In the past, most theoretical works on endogenous growth (e.g. Romer, 1986, 1990;
Lucas, 1988 ; Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991a, 1991b; and Jones 1995) and research on innovation and firm dynamics (e.g., KK;
Luttmer, 2007, 2012; and Atkeson and Burstein, 2010) have not considered path-dependence in
firm innovation behavior across multiple sectors, as these papers typically assume a single type
of technological change or implicitly assume a homogeneous technology space in which innovation
takes place in any sector with equal probability.
Empirical work by Jaffe (1986), on the other hand, suggests that firms’ technological position
provides different technological opportunities that matter for firms’ innovative success. In that
paper, however, firms’ technology position is exogenous. Our study advances Jaffe’s work by
constructing a structural model which allows for the endogenous sorting of firms across technology
classes, providing further understanding of the relationship between technological opportunities
and firms’ dynamic R&D decisions. Other empirical works by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009,
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2010) document that most firms switch their products frequently, and that endogenous product
selection has important implications on firm and aggregate productivity. Obviously, our focus is
entirely different: we examine firm innovation behavior instead of production performance. The
more interesting difference is that the presence of inter-sectoral knowledge linkages fundamentally
affect firms’ R&D/patent allocation and their sectoral entry decisions.
Distinguishing between different types of research and their impact is currently being pursued
in a number of papers. Akcigit, Hanley and Serrano-Velarde (2016) analyses the impact of ap-
propriability on firms’ incentives to conduct basic research relative to applied research. Akcigit
and Kerr (2016) studies how exploration versus exploitation innovations affect growth. Akin to
this notion, Acemoglu and Cao (2015) considers incremental R&D engaged in by incumbents and
radical R&D undertaken by potential entrants. Different from these studies, we consider a richer
structure of technological interdependence, and integrate it into the endogenous growth models.
Our work also builds on the earlier literature in development economics that emphasizes the role
of sectoral linkages and complementarity in explaining growth (see Leontief, 1936 and Hirschman,
1958). Previous work in this area typically focuses on vertical input-output relationships in produc-
tion between sectors—as in Jones (2011) and Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015), and export-based
measures of product relatedness—as in Hidalgo, Klinger and Hausmann (2007) and Hausmann,
Hwang and Rodrik (2007).
Finally, this paper also adds to previous works studying the determinants of persistent cross-
sector differences in R&D intensity (e.g. Ngai and Samiengo, 2011; Klenow, 1996). Empirical
evidence and the model developed in this paper both suggest that these differences can be attributed
to technology applicability. We relegate the detailed discussions to Section 2.2.
The paper begins by presenting some new sector-level and firm-level findings which motivated
our modeling approach. The model itself is developed and stationary balanced growth path equi-
librium is characterized in Section 3. We then discuss firm, sectoral and aggregate implications
generated by the model in Section 4. Section 5 discusses estimation and parameterization of the
model, the ability of the model to replicate key observations and the results from counterfactual
simulations. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications and future works.
2 Empirical Underpinning
This section starts by describing the algorithm for constructing our measure of “applicability”. It
then documents several novel empirical observations that motivate our model using patent citations,
firm patenting and R&D investment data.
Data Description Our main data source is the 2006 edition U.S. Patent and Trade Office
(USPTO) data from 1976 to 2006 (see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001 for detailed description of
the data). We focus on firm patenting activities in this paper, as the model is designed to mainly
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understand firm innovation behavior. We observe the set of technological classes in which each firm
applied for patent in each year and the citations associated with each patent application. Patent
applications serve as proxies of firms’ innovative output, and their citations are used to trace the
direction and intensity of knowledge flows within and across technological classes.6 In the dataset,
each patent is assigned to one of the 428 three-digit United States Patent Classification System
(USPCS) technological fields (NClass) and belongs to one to seven out of the 42 two-to-four-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories.7 The latter classification is used when we ex-
amine R&D at the sector level, because other sources of sector-specific characteristics are only
available at the SIC level. Firm-level evidence, however, is reported based on more disaggregated
NClass classification. Another data source is U.S. Compustat (1970-2000) which contains firm-level
R&D expenditure and sales data associated with each sector. We use this information to obtain
sector-specific R&D intensity.
2.1 The Measure of Technology Applicability
The Network of Inter-sectoral Knowledge Linkages We sum up patent citations connecting
different technology classes to form the inter-sectoral knowledge diffusion network. Since we are
interested in studying the deep, long-run characteristics between different technologies, we use
patent citation data spanning the 1976-2006 period to form this network. Pooled citations for 30
years also help to smooth out noises in the annual data. We also test the sensitivity of our results
to the use of time-variant knowledge linkages network based on rolling-window subsamples. The
results, available in Appendix A.2, are robust to this alternative approach.
Figure I presents the network of inter-sectoral knowledge linkages, based on citations made
between 428 3-digit technology classes. Each vertex corresponds to one type of technology, and every
arrow indicates the direction of the knowledge flow. The darker color of the arrows signals a larger
number of citations. The network exhibits strong heterogeneity in technology interconnections:
not all technologies cite each other and some sectors are heavily cited while others are not. There
are a few clusters of closely connected technologies, suggesting that they have a disproportionately
important effect of knowledge spillovers.
Calculating Sector-Specific Technology Applicability The relationships of knowledge com-
plementarity, especially the higher-order interconnections, make it difficult to evaluate the contri-
bution of any innovation to the entire technology space. Hence, the first challenge is to construct
6Although patent statistics have been widely used in studies of firm innovations, not all innovations are patented,
especially process innovations, which are often protected in other ways such as copyright, trademarks and secrecy
(see Levin Klevorick, Nelson and Winter (1987)). Our measure implicitly assumes that for any sector, the unpatented
and patented knowledge utilizes knowledge (patented or unpatented) from other sectors in the same manner, with
the same likelihood and intensity.
7We use the probability mapping provided by USPTO to assign patents into different SIC categories. Details of
the concordance are available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/data/sic conc.
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Figure I: Intersectoral Network Corresponding to Patent Citations between 428 Technology Classes
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Data Source: NBER patent citation data, 428 technological categories (NClasses).
Notes: A (directed) link is drawn for every citation link that counts more than 5% of the total citations made by the
citing sector.
such a sector-specific measure that characterizes the importance of different sectors as knowledge
suppliers to their immediate application sectors as well as their role as indirect contributors to
chains of downstream sectors.
To handle this issue, we apply Kleinberg’s (1999) algorithm to the citation network and con-
struct a measure quantifying the applicability of each technology. This algorithm generates two
inter-dependent indices for each node in the network: the authority weight (awi)—the ability of
contributing knowledge to the entire network; and the hub weight (hwi)—the ability of absorbing
knowledge. We use the authority weight as our measure of technology applicability, appi ≡ awi.
Formally, let J be a set of technology categories. A citation matrix for J is a |J |×|J | nonnegative
matrix (cji)(i,j)∈J×J . For each i, j ∈ J , c
ji denotes the number of citations to sector i made by j
(indicating knowledge flow from i to j). Then, the authority weight is calculated according to:
awi = λ
∑
j∈J
W jihwj ,
hwi = µ
∑
j∈J
W ijawj , (1)
where λ and µ are the inverse of the Euclidean norms of vectors (awi)i∈J and (hw
i)i∈J , respectively.
W ji denotes the weight of the link, corresponding to the strength of knowledge contribution by
7
i to j and is set to cji.8 Intuitively, the technology with high authority weight provides large
knowledge flows to sectors with highly ranked hub weights, and the technology with high hub
weight largely utilizes knowledge flows from sectors with highly ranked authority weights. Kleinberg
(1999) shows that this algorithm is more efficient at extracting information from a highly linked
network environment compared to other quantitative indicators such as Garfield’s “impact factor”
and Pinski and Narin’s “influence weight”.9
A list of the ten most and ten least applicable technologies based on awi is provided in Table I.
The ranking of technologies appears sensible. The ten least applicable technologies tend to be less
sophisticated ones which have little application to innovations in other sectors. The technologies
listed as the most applicable also seem reasonable.
Table I: The Ten Most and Ten Least Applicable Technologies (NClass-based)
Most applicable Least applicable
NClass Technology description NClass Technology description
438 Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process 258 Railway Mail Delivery
257 Active Solid-State Devices 276 Typesetting
365 Static Information Storage and Retrieval 147 Coopering
361 Electricity: Electrical Systems and Devices 278 Land Vehicles: Animal Draft Appliances
428 Stock Material or Miscellaneous Articles 199 Type Casting
427 Coating Processes 314 Electric Lamp and Discharge Devices
430 Radiation Imagery Chemistry 79 Button Making
29 Metal Working 520 Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers
216 Etching a Substrate: Processes 295 Railway Wheels and Axles
324 Electricity: Measuring and Testing 231 Whips and Whip Apparatus
To distinguish our notion of knowledge applicability from other characterization of technologies—
especially to emphasize the role of indirect knowledge linkages—we calculate the following measures
for comparison. First, to differentiate the applicability across sectors from that within the sector,
we construct a self-applicability measure using the number of citations received from the same sec-
tor per patent. Second, we consider an indicator that captures the importance of different sectors
as a direct knowledge contributor: the weighted (in)degree, or degree. degreei ≡
∑
j s
ji, where the
weight sji(= cji/
∑
k c
jk) is the fraction of citations made by j that is attributed to i.10 Third,
8In the previous version of the paper, we also investigated results based on binomial weight: W ji = 1 if j cites i
and zero otherwise. That is, the weight is independent of the relative size between i and j. All the results still hold.
9Garfield’s impact factor is the average number of citations received by a sector (pure in-degree counting), and
hence is too crude a measure, as not all citations are equally important. Pinski and Narin’s influence weight is a
one-level iterative algorithm. The influence of i is the weighted sum of the influences of all sectors citing i. That
is wi =
∑
j
sjiwj , where sji denotes the fraction of the citations from j that go to i. This method does not make
a distinction between the importance as a contributor and the importance as a learner. Another advantage of
Kleinberg’s two-level pattern of linkages is that it exposes structure among both the set of hubs who may not know
of one another’s existence, and the set of authorities who may not wish to acknowledge each other’s existence. Thus,
it is more efficient at extracting information about the potential, as opposed to realized, knowledge contribution of
each node.
10This measure is often applied to production Input-Output matrix (e.g. Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). It is similar to Garfield (1972)’s “impact factor” or pure counting of the in-degrees of citations
links, which only captures the sector’s importance as knowledge supplier to its immediate application sectors.
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we compare it to the generality index originally proposed by Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson
(1997), which in our context corresponds to generalityi = 1 −
∑
j(s˜
ji)2, where s˜ji(= cji/
∑
h c
hi)
is the fraction of citations made by j to i out of total citations received. Conceptually, generality
captures a different notion from applicability. A sector directly cited by a wide range of sectors
provides more general knowledge, but does not necessarily have a large overall knowledge impact,
as the citing sectors themselves may not be important. Especially, Table II shows that our measures
of applicability and generality are almost uncorrelated and even negatively correlated at the less
disaggregated level (SIC). In addition, although the correlations between knowledge applicability
and other indicators are positive, they are well below unity.
Table II: Correlations Between Applicability, Direct Spillovers, Generality and Self-Applicability
NClass SIC
(all in log) applicability degree generality self applicability degree generality self
applicability 1 1
degree 0.330** 1 0.549** 1
generality 0.088 -0.121 1 -0.324* -0.436** 1
self 0.449** 0.643** -0.506 1 0.670** 0.766** -0.148 1
Notes: Correlation coefficients are reported. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent level,
respectively.
2.2 Sector-level Observations
Observation 1: Sectoral R&D intensity increases with its technology applicability.
It has been documented previously in the literature that there are large and persistent cross-
sector differences in R&D intensity. The literature has pointed to “technological opportunities” as
one of the key explanations for these variations. Conceptually, technological opportunity reflects
factors that allow research in some sectors to be more productive than others, such as sectoral
future TFP growth as in Klenow (1996) or the opportunity in terms of knowledge spillovers from
various sources as in Nelson (1988). Our measure of technology applicability provides a natural
interpretation of Nelson’s (1988) notion of technological opportunity and allows us to empirically
investigate its relationship with sector-specific R&D intensity.
Table III reports determinants of long-run sectoral R&D intensity (averaged over 30 years
for each SIC sector) based on different regression specifications. The sectoral R&D intensity is
measured in three ways. In Column (1)–(4), sectoral R&D is measured by total R&D expenditure
by all firms in a given sector divided by its sales value. Column (5) and (6) use the median ratio
and the mean ratio of R&D expenditures to sales among firms in the same sector, respectively.
All regressions control for sectoral market size (measured by sales) and profitability (measured
by value of shipment, excluding material cost, divided by labor compensation). The former is
motivated by prior empirical studies which suggest that a larger market size, indicating demand
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pull factor, creates an incentive for firms to invest in R&D.11 Including profitability as a regressor
is motivated by our theoretical model in Section 3. We also control for self-applicability in Column
(2)-(6), future (scaled) TFP growth following Klenow (1996) in Column (3)-(6),12 and cross-sector
variations in direct knowledge spillovers (using the “degree” index) and knowledge “generality” in
Column (4)-(6).
Table III: The Determinants of Sectoral R&D Intensity
Sectoral R&D/ Sectoral sales Median Intensity Mean Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log app 0.199 0.289 0.296 0.292 0.461 0.377
(0.048)** (0.060)** (0.060)** (0.062)** (0.123)** (0.139)*
log sales -0.059 -0.040 -0.033 -0.044 -0.294 -0.008
(0.069) (0.069) (0.074) (0.080) (0.114)* (0.121)
profitability 0.051 0.059 0.058 0.050 0.242 0.243
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.090)* (0.068)**
log self -app -0.085 -0.088 -0.048 -0.107 0.087
(0.035)* (0.035)* (0.052) (0.085) (0.094)
∆(scaled)TFP -0.014 -0.022 0.101 0.065
(0.033) (0.022) (0.114) (0.091)
log degree -0.367 0.194 0.111
(0.392) (1.123) (0.931)
log generality -0.922 0.215 -1.633
(0.524) (1.477) (1.395)
No. of observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
R2 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.61
Notes: The dependent variables are sectoral R&D expenditure divided by sectoral sales, or median R&D intensity
(RI) or mean R&D intensity among firms in the same sector, taking average over 1970-2000. Regression coefficients
are reported, with robust standard errors in brackets. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5 percent
level, respectively. The constant terms are omitted to save space.
Across all specifications, technology applicability has a statistically significant positive associa-
tion with R&D intensity across sectors, even when allowing for other technology characteristics to
play a role simultaneously. Self-applicability, whenever significant, in fact is negatively associated
with R&D intensity. In addition, similarly to previous studies, sales and research productivity
11The previous literature using survey data (e.g. Cohen, Levin and Mowery, 1987) also suggests that appropriability
(the extent to which R&D benefits the inventor) might play a role in understanding cross-sector variations in R&D
intensity. However, as pointed out by Ngai and Samaniego (2011) the particular survey question was designed in
a way that cannot distinguish appropriability from opportunity. They also find that appropriability does not vary
much across sectors, and hence cannot explain the persistent differences in sectoral R&D.
12The TFP growth two years ahead is scaled by the average R&D intensity. The sector-specific profitability and
TFP data are constructed using NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. We first map all 4-digit SIC87
industries in the dataset into 4-digit SIC72 industries using the concordance provided by the database. The 4-digit
SIC72 industries are then mapped into 42 technology fields using the concordance provided by USPTO. NBER-CES
manufacturing industry database provides information on value of shipment, payroll, employment, material cost,
total factor productivity for each individual manufacturing sectors, which can be used to construct profitability and
TFP for the more aggregated 42 sectors. We consider both average profitability for the current period and average
profitability two years ahead. The results are virtually the same.
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(TFP growth scaled by R&D intensity) are not significantly related to R&D intensity at the sector
level. However, at the firm level, median firm R&D intensity is found to increase with the sector-
specific profitability but decrease with the sector’s market size (Column (5)), perhaps reflecting the
negative impact of within-sector competition on individual firm’s R&D.
These results suggest that overall knowledge spillovers, not just the direct spillovers, to down-
stream knowledge application sectors matter for understanding the cross-sector variations in R&D
intensity. Forward-looking innovating firms allocate their R&D resources not only according to prof-
itability in their current sectors but also the potential applicability of the knowledge in fostering
future innovations in other sectors. Section 3 develops a model to conceptualize this intuition.
2.3 Firm-level Observations
In the dataset, at any given period t, each firm is identified by its history of patent applications,
{(P 1f,τ , P
2
f,τ , ..., P
428
f,τ )}τ=1,2,...,t, where P
i
f,τ is the number of patents firm f applied for in period τ
in technology class i. Let Sif,t denote firm f ’s patent stock in t. For simplicity, we assume that
there is no physical depreciation of knowledge.13 Hence, Sif,t = S
i
f,t−1 + P
i
f,t, and its total patent
stock is Sf,t =
∑
i∈J S
i
f,t. To measure a firm’s multi-technology patenting (or knowledge scope), we
count the number of distinct technology classes in which firm has patented and denote it by Nf,t.
We find that firms with larger patent stock also tend to innovate in a wider range of technology
classes, with the correlation between Sf,t and Nf,t greater than 95 percent for most years.
In order to characterize the applicability of a firm’s knowledge, it is convenient to first define
the firm’s technological position by the distribution of the firm’s patents over all patent classes,
as in Jaffe (1986). Let vector Tf,t = (T
1
f,t, T
2
f,t, ..., T
428
f,t ), where T
i
f,t = S
i
f,t/Sf,t, stand for firm
f ’s “technological position” in t. A firm’s overall technology applicability measure, TAf , is then
calculated as the (weighted) average applicability of its technologies: TAf,t =
∑
i∈J T
i
f,t log(app
i).
Thus, a firm’s knowledge applicability is constructed independent of its knowledge stock. Similarly,
the applicability of firm f ’s new technology classes—the new sectors that the firm entered in t—
is calculated as TAnewsecf,t =
∑
i∈J
P i,newsec
f,t
Pnewsec
f,t
log(appi), where the superscript “newsec” signals that
sector i is new to firm f at t. Using all these firm-level measures, we then document observations
as follows.
Observation 2 (Sectoral Composition): Firms with more patents (or more technological
classes) are more concentrated in highly applicable technologies.
13Note that knowledge capital is different from R&D capital, which can literally depreciate over time as research
labs are physical investment. For knowledge capital to depreciate, it means some idea is lost. In the literature
there is a distinction between physical depreciation and economic depreciation of knowledge capital. Here we assume
no physical depreciation, but make no assumption about economic depreciation. As shown in the Model section,
knowledge capital in fact depreciates economically when newer knowledge accumulates in the same sector, and the
depreciation rate is endogenous.
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Observation 3 (Sectoral Entry): As firms accumulate more patent in more technological
glasses, they gradually enter sectors with lower technology applicability.
Figure II illustrates the scale dependence in firms’ patent allocation and entry pattern using the
year with the highest number of firms (1997) as an example year. Results are similar in other years.
All firms are divided into 40 bins according to their patent stocks (left panel) or their numbers of
technology classes (right panel). The average firm in each bin constitutes one observation. The
left panel plots firms’ technology applicability, TAf , against their patent stock, Sf , distinguishing
the applicability of new sectors the firm entered in 1997, TAnewsecf (the hollow triangles with the
downward sloping fitted line) from its overall applicability (the solid dots the upward sloping line).14
The right panel plots firms’ technology applicability against numbers of technology classes in which
the firms are engaged in patenting, Nf .
Figure II: Firm’s Technology Applicability, Patent Stock and Multi-Technology Patenting
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Notes: Y-axis measures the (weighted) average applicability of the firm’s patent portfolio, TAf . Firms are divided
into 40 bins according to their patent stocks (left panel) or their numbers of technology classes (right panel). Each
observation corresponds to an average firm in the same size bin. Both x- and y-axes are in log scale. The underlying
sectors correspond to the Nclass technology fields categorized by USPTO. Data source: NBER Patent Data, 2006
edition.
Two observations stand out. First, firms with more knowledge capital (left panel) or broader
knowledge scope (right panel) tend to innovate more in highly applicable technologies. This obser-
vation, however, is sharply reversed when focusing on the new technology classes firms just entered:
TAnewsecf is negatively related to both patent stock and the number of classes. Second, across firms
of various sizes, the new sectors entered by a given firm tend to be less applicable relative to the
14A sector is new to a firm if the firm has not innovated in that sector before. The full data set expands from 1901
to 2006, thus, providing a good sample for identifying new sectors for each individual firm.
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existing sectors (i.e. the observations that identify new sectors lie below the observations of all
sectors), except for the very small firms.
Next, using firm-year observations, we explore how a firm’s technology applicability is related
to its knowledge stock (Sf ) and scope (Nf ) based on fixed-effects panel regressions. The dependent
variable is TAft in Column (1) and (2) of Table IV, and TA
newsec
f,t in Column (3) and (4).
15 The full
set of year dummies is included to control for the level and change of any year-specific characteristic
that influences the applicability of firm’s technology. Firm-fixed effects control for any constant
firm-specific characters. Both fixed effects deal with unobserved heterogeneity and error terms are
allowed to be heteroskedastic and serially correlated.
As shown in Table IV, firms’ technological position and sectoral entry are systematically related
to their knowledge stock and scope. When firms become larger and have more knowledge in more
areas, they become increasingly concentrated in highly applicable technologies. At the same time,
this allows them to enter less occupied, less applicable technology classes.
Table IV: Firm’s Patent Allocation, Knowledge Stock and Knowledge Applicability
TAf,t TA
newsec
f,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Sf,t−1) 0.019 -0.225
(0.004)** (0.003)**
log(Nf,t−1) 0.040 -0.330
(0.006)** (0.004)**
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 848593 848593 382968 382968
Notes: The dependent variables are the applicability of the firm’s existing technology portfolio at time t for Column
(1) and (2) and the applicability of the new sectors the firm entered at time t for Column (3) and (4). Regressions
include firm and year fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for
clustering by firms in brackets. Sample covers every year between 1976 and 2006. ** indicates significance at the 1
percent level. The constant terms are omitted to save space.
To further investigate how firms expand across different technology classes over time, we zero in
on the new patent applications firms filed in each period. Note that the new patent applications are
not necessarily in new technology classes. We adopt the following regressions using firm-sector-year
observations, controlling for firm-fixed effects (ηf ) and year-fixed effects (µt):
log(appif,t) = β1Newsec
i
f,t + β2 log(Sf,t−1) + β3Newsec
i
f,t × log(Sf,t−1) + ηf + µt + υ
i
f,t, (2)
where appif,t is the applicability of technology i in which firm f filed at least one patent at time t,
and Newsecif,t is a dummy indicating that i is new to the firm at time t.
Table V shows evidence that is consistent with the previous firm-level observations. Column
15Since these two variables are highly correlated (correlation equals 0.93), we cannot include them in the same
regression as that will cause multicollinearity issue.
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(1) shows results based on Equation (2) while Column (2) substitutes Sf,t−1 with Nf,t−1. β2 > 0
for both cases implying that in the sectors that a firm has previously entered, it tends to innovate
more in the highly applicable technology classes as it grows larger. This is because the firm can now
internalize this highly applicable knowledge in more sectors and thus has more incentive to do so.
However, when it grows larger, the new technologies that a firm enters are farther away from the
centre of the technology space than its existing technologies (β3 < 0). As a firm accumulates more
knowledge capital and in more categories, it can now apply this knowledge to enter sectors which
are less connected with its existing knowledge portfolio, and enjoy less competition and higher
market share.
Table V: Firm’s Sectoral Entry Selection, Knowledge Stock and Knowledge Scope
Dependent Variable: log(appif,t) (1) (2)
Newsecif,t 0.087 0.103
(0.006)** (0.006)**
log(Sf,t−1) 0.015
(0.006)**
Newsecif,t × log(Sf,t−1) -0.137
(0.005)**
log(Nf,t−1) 0.080
(0.009)**
Newsecif,t × log(Nf,t−1) -0.208
(0.007)**
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
No. of obs 995,244 995,244
Notes: The dependent variables are the natural log of applicability of the technology class in which the firm applied
for patent at time t. Regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported, with robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering by firms in brackets. Sample covers every year between 1976 and 2006. **
and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively.
Observation 4 (Innovation Rate): Controlling for the initial patent stock and patent scope,
firms whose initial technologies are more applicable innovate faster.
We adopt a firm growth regression by regressing firms’ subsequent innovation rate on their
previous knowledge applicability and patent stock, controlling for firm-fixed effects and year-fixed
effect:16
gf,t = γ1 log(Sf,t−1) + γ2 log(Nf,t−1) + γ3TAf,t−1 + ηf + µt + υf,t, (3)
where the outcome variable innovation rate, gf,t = Pf,t/Sf,t−1, is firm f ’s number of patent ap-
plications in t as a percentage of its previous patent stock. Furthermore, we differentiate a firm’s
16We also investigate quality-adjusted innovation rates, which are measured by the growth rates of the forward-
citation-weighted number of patents. When adjusted by the number of inward citations, the results are largely
unchanged although larger firms’ growth rates drop even faster.
14
growth in its existing sectors from its growth into new sectors. Define the innovation rate gint as
the intensive innovation rate as a result of patent applications in existing classes, and gext as the
extensive innovation rate associated with patent applications in new technological classes. That is,
gextt = P
Newsec
f,t /Sf,t−1, g
int
t = (Pf,t−P
Newsec
f,t )/Sf,t−1. In addition, innovation usually takes several
years to occur. Hence there are often large time gaps between a firm’s current patent application
and its next one in the data. Therefore, gf,t is set to 0 during the years when firms did not apply
for patent, and the results based on this are presented in Column (1)-(3). However, when we do
not observe firm patenting, we have no information whether the firm has exited. Therefore, as an
alternative method, we apply Heckman two-step processor to our regression to correct for selection
bias, using firm’s age as an instrument of exclusion restriction (Column (4)).
As shown in Table VI, the positive coefficients on the term TAf,t−1 across all specifications
indicate that firms whose initial technology applicability is greater, innovate faster subsequently,
after controlling for knowledge stock and knowledge scope. Although not the focus of our paper, the
result also shows that firms with larger initial knowledge stock tend to experience lower innovation
rate in subsequent periods (i.e. the coefficient on log(Sf,t−1) is negative). This could reflect the
decreasing return of learning to scale: The more private knowledge a firm accumulates, the less is
there to learn from others in relative terms. Broader scope of knowledge, on the other hand, allows
firms to innovate faster, again pointing to the importance of inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers.
Table VI: Firm Innovation Rate, Knowledge Applicability, Stock and Scope
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
overall intensive extensive Heckman Selection Including self-applicability
g gint gext Main Selection g gint gext
TAf,t−1 0.028 0.008 0.020 0.081 0.051 0.025 −0.000 0.025
(0.007)** (0.003)* (0.006)** (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.007)** (0.003) (0.006)**
log(Sf,t−1) -1.173 -0.824 -0.349 -0.278 1.178 -1.175 -0.829 -0.346
(0.013)** (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.009)** (0.013)** (0.009)** (0.008)**
log(Nf,t−1) 0.144 0.789 -0.646 0.120 0.201 0.146 0.796 -0.650
(0.014)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.007)** (0.011)** (0.015)** (0.010)** (0.010)**
age -0.042
(0.000)**
SAf,t−1 0.085 0.224 -0.139
(0.033)* (0.016)** (0.027)**
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs 533,740 533,740 533,740 533,740 533,740 533,740 533,740
Notes: The dependent variables are the innovation rate (gf,t) for Column (1), (4) and (5), and the decomposition of
the innovation growth rate in the existing sectors (ginft) for Column (2) and (6), and innovation rate in the new sectors
(gexft ) for Column (3) and (7). Regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported,
with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by firms in brackets. Sample covers every year between 1976 and
2006. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively.
In addition, both intensive and extensive firm innovation rates increase with firm’s initial knowl-
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edge applicability, although the effect is larger on the extensive margin. This suggests that a central
position on the technology space promotes firm innovation mainly through providing prerequisite
knowledge while the firm expands into new sectors. Not surprisingly, while firm’s scope enhances
intensive innovation rate, it discourages extensive innovation. When inspecting the first stage of
selection estimation of the Heckman procedure, higher knowledge applicability, larger knowledge
stock and scope all increase the firm’s survival probability, whereas firms’ age significantly decreases
the probability. In addition, Columns (5)-(7) show that it is the self-applicability that explains fu-
ture innovation growth on the intensive margin, and once it is controlled for, TAf no longer plays
a significant role in explaining future intensive growth. However, self-applicability plays a negative
role in predicting firms’ future innovation on the extensive margin, as firms have less incentive
to expand across the technology space when its knowledge can be easily applied to develop new
products within the same sector.
Discussions We have presented a set of new observations which points to the importance of
inter-sectoral knowledge linkages in understanding cross-sector differences in R&D intensity and
firms’ multi-technology innovation decisions. In particular, we establish that indirect higher-order
knowledge linkages with other sectors matter and help to direct firms’ R&D allocation—in addition
to within-sector applicability and direct knowledge spillover to immediate downstream sectors. In
Appendix A.2 we show that all the findings are robust to alternative measures of knowledge appli-
cability (e.g. time-variant technology applicability or quality-adjusted measure of applicability) or
allowing firm’s patent stock to depreciate.
Existing theories without multiple sectors and/or knowledge interconnections between sectors
cannot explain the observed relationship between firms’ innovational activities (including sectoral
entry, R&D allocation and innovation rate) and technology applicability/knowledge linkages. Mo-
tivated by these reduced-form analyses, in the following section we develop a general equilibrium
multi-sector framework that helps us to interpret these observations.
3 The Model
Our model extends the previous literature on firm innovation and growth (especially, Klette and
Kortum (2004)) to a multi-sector environment and is built on the tradition of variety expanding
models (e.g., Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991a; Jones 1995).17 The novel element is that
sectors are connected by their knowledge linkages. It regards innovation as a process of generating
new varieties in different sectors by applying existing knowledge in all related sectors. The existing
knowledge includes both in-house knowledge, public knowledge and the external knowledge obtained
from the licensing market which will be specified later. Therefore, allowing for external knowledge
17Recently, Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) provides strong empirical evidence showing that firm patenting
is associated with firm growth through the introduction of new products.
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in the process of innovation is another notable difference from KK. In linking the model to the
data, we interpret our sector as corresponding to different technology classes in the patent data,
while varieties/blueprints within a sector map into patents granted in the respective technological
class.18
We present the model in steps starting with goods demand and firm’s static production decision,
which follow the standard setup in the variety-expanding literature. We then introduce the dynamic
multi-sector R&D, entry/exit decisions of firms which constitutes the main departure of our model
from the existing literature. Industry behavior (including firm size distribution, mass of firms and
R&D allocation across sectors) is then analyzed and the model is solved for aggregate implications.
We are interested in the long-run properties of our model and thus will focus on the stationary
Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium (hereafter BGP) in which output, consumption and innovation
grow at constant rates, and firm size distribution is stationary. The only source of uncertainty in
the model are firm-sector-specific shocks to the success of R&D and to the fixed costs of research,
and there are no shocks to goods production or shocks at the sectoral/economy-wide level.
3.1 Goods Demand and Production
Demand The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical infinitely-lived households.
Households order their preferences over a lifetime stream of consumption {Ct} of the final good
according to
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−ηt
1− η
, (4)
where β is the discount factor and η is the risk-aversion coefficient. A typical household inelastically
supplies a fixed unit of labor, L, which is allocated to produce goods, to conduct research or to
maintain research labs (fixed costs of research). Households have access to a one-period risk-free
bond with interest rate rt and in zero aggregate supply. Optimal inter-temporal substitution of
consumption implies
β(
Ct+1
Ct
)−η
Pt
Pt+1
(1 + rt) = 1. (5)
The final good is produced by combining all types of sectoral intermediate goods {Qit} according
to a Cobb-Douglas production function
log Yt =
∑
i∈J
si log
(
Qit
)
, (6)
where si captures the share of each sector in production of the final good. Without physical capital
18We refer to the terms technologies, technology classes and sectors interchangeably in the paper, as in the model
one sector embodies one specific type of technology. Although distinguishing technology classes from industry classes
can be interesting for certain issues (e.g. Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2010), it is not the focus of this
paper.
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in this closed-economy, the final good is only used for consumption: Ct = Yt. Let J be the set of
all sectors and K be the total number of sectors, i.e. |J | = K.
At any moment, any sector i ∈ J contains a set of varieties that were invented before time t,
indexed by k ∈ [0, nit], where n
i
t is the number (measure) of differentiated goods that are produced
by individual monopolistically competitive firms.
Qit =
[∫ nit
0
(
xik,t
)σi−1
σi dk
] σi
σi−1
, ∀i ∈ J , (7)
where xik,t is the consumption of variety k in sector i and σ
i > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated goods in the same sector i.
The associated final good price is Pt = B
∏
i∈J (P
i
t )
si , where B is some constant consis-
tent with the Cobb-Douglas specification in (6) and the sectoral price index is given by P it =[∫ nit
0 p
1−σi
k,t dk
] 1
1−σi . These aggregates can then be used to derive the optimal consumption for sector-
i goods and for individual variety k in sector i using xik,t =
(
pi
k,t
P it
)−σi
Qit, where Q
i
t = s
i PtYt
P it
.
Production Firms undertake two distinct activities: they create blueprints for new varieties of
differentiated products and manufacture the products that have been invented. The firm inventing
a new variety is the sole supplier of that variety. We assume that each differentiated good is
manufactured according to a common technology: to produce one unit of any variety requires one
unit of labor.
Without heterogeneity in production and demand, all varieties in the same sector are completely
symmetric: they charge the same price and are sold in the same quantity. The firm producing variety
k in sector i faces a residual demand curve with constant elasticity σi.19 Wage is normalized to
one: wt = 1. This yields a constant pricing rule:
pik,t =
σi
σi − 1
, ∀k, i, t. (8)
Thus the sectoral price, P it =
σi
σi−1
(nit)
1
1−σ , decreases with the number of varieties in that sector.
Combining the pricing rule with the demand equation for individual variety, we derive the total
profit in sector i from production as a constant share of GDP. As will be clear later, without
population growth, the nominal GDP is constant: PtYt = PY . Thus, sectoral profit is constant:
πit =
∫ nit
0
pik,tx
i
k,t
σi
dk =
siPY
σi
. (9)
19To make the analysis more tractable, we follow Hopenhayn (1992) and Klette and Kortum (2004) by assuming
that each firm is relatively small compared to the entire sector.
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The demand for production labor in sector i is
Lip,t =
∫ ni
0
xik,tdk =
σi − 1
σi
siPY. (10)
3.2 Innovation
3.2.1 Knowledge Creation
There is a continuum of firms, each developing new varieties and producing in a set of sectors. A
firm f at time t is defined by a vector of its blueprints in all sectors, zf,t = (z
i
f,t)i∈J , where z
i
f,t ≥ 0
is the number of blueprints (or the amount of knowledge capital) of sector-i goods produced by firm
f at time t. Let Sf,t = {i : s.t. z
i
f,t > 0} ⊆ J denote the set of sectors in which firm f produces
at time t and F it = {f : s.t. z
i
f,t > 0} denote the set of firms that produce in sector i. Then the
total number of varieties in sector i, nit =
∫
f∈F it
zif,tdf.
Firm f ’s knowledge capital in i accumulates according to
zif,t+1 = z
i
f,t +∆z
i
f,t, i ∈ Sf,t+1, (11)
where the new knowledge, ∆zif,t, is created by conducting R&D to adapt prior related knowledge
in all sectors. The prior knowledge of sector j comprises private knowledge and public knowledge.
For convenience we call the innovative activities associated with the former “invention” and the
activity associated with the latter “imitation”. Since knowledge linkages are heterogeneous across
sectors, we index firm’s R&D investment by its knowledge source sector and knowledge application
sector. Specifically, Rijf denotes a firm’s investment in R&D associated with applying its knowledge
in sector j (source sector) to innovation in i (application sector). The productivity of this R&D
activity depends crucially on the knowledge applicability from j to i, Aij . In the process of creating
knowledge in various sectors, firms take the knowledge diffusion matrix, A = [Aij ](i,j)∈J×J , as
exogenous.20
Formally, new knowledge in sector i is created based on the knowledge creation function:21
∆zif,t =
∑
j∈J

Aij (z¯itRijv,ft)α (zjf,t + κ(lijf,t/zif,t)lijf,t)1−α εijf,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Invention
+Aij
(
z¯itR
ij
m,ft
)α (
θz¯jt
)1−α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imitation

 (12)
20It might be true that as technologies advance over time the interactions between them evolve, forming a dynamic
network instead of a static one. Also, these relationships of complementarity may be hard to predict and not
necessarily visible or well understood by innovators. Here, we intentionally choose to concentrate on the implications
of “deep”, time-invariant characteristics of technological linkages on firm’s innovation and leave the study of dynamic
knowledge network formation to future work, as we view the former as a necessary first step.
21The advantage of using additive instead of multiplicative function to combine the blueprints created using different
source knowledge is that the separability of additive function allows for linear function of firms’ value, which makes
the model more tractable. In addition, it allows for Pareto firm size distribution in each sector (as shown in Sections
3.2.3) and B.3.
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where Rijv,ft is the number of researchers adapting private knowledge to invent, while R
ij
m,ft is
the number of researchers adopting public knowledge to imitate. There are two kinds of private
knowledge: own knowledge (zjf,t) and external knowledge acquired from other firms (l
ij
f,t) which
can be used for only one period. We will specify the acquisition of external knowledge later. The
absorption capacity is given by the function κ(·) ∈ (0, 1), which governs the fraction of acquired
knowledge from other firms that is ultimately absorbed and utilized by the licensee. z¯itR
ij
ft is the
effective R&D input with z¯it = n
i
t/M
i
t being the average knowledge capital per firm in sector i and
M it being the number of innovating firms in sector i at time t. α denotes the share of effective R&D
input. θ governs the adaptability of the public knowledge relative to the own private knowledge.
εijf,t is the shock to invention.
We explain various features of (12) in detail as follows. First, similarly to KK, we assume
that the knowledge creation function is constant returns to scale. In addition, the researchers’
efficiency is proportional to the average knowledge capital per firm in the innovating sector, z¯it. This
assumption keeps the number of R&D workers constant in the BGP equilibrium while the number
of varieties increases. As shown in Section 4.3 and discussed in Peretto (1998), it removes the “scale
effect” from the model—that is, the endogenous growth rate of the economy is independent of its
population size.
Second, in the process of developing new knowledge in sector i, a firm utilizes all existing
knowledge available—its own knowledge, acquired external knowledge and public knowledge from
all sectors. The absorption of either acquired knowledge or public knowledge requires R&D input
(in the spirit of Cohen and Levinthal (1990)), as opposed to other models where learning from
others might be effortless. Importantly, we assume κ(·) is a decreasing function of external-to-own
knowledge ratio (lijft/z
i
f,t): κ
′(lijf,t/z
i
f,t) < 0. That is, more own knowledge compared to external
knowledge allows the “learner” to internalize the knowledge more effectively. We will show later
that this assumption is necessary for the model to generate endogenous sorting of firms in different
sectors.
Third, the size of the public knowledge pool is assumed to be proportional to z¯jt . As firms
randomly meet and exchange ideas with a limited number of peers, the average knowledge capital is
a reasonable proxy for the size of the accessible public knowledge.22 As will be clear later, imitation
is allowed in the model such that new firms with no prior knowledge of any sorts can imitate to
enter. The different value of public knowledge across sectors also helps to explain sequential sectoral
entry. In addition, imitation helps to mitigate the dispersion of firm size distribution by preventing
firms from becoming too small.
Lastly, innovation by its nature involves the discovery of the unknown and the success of a
research project can be uncertain. We assume that invention is subject to idiosyncratic shocks εijf,t
22The similar assumption can be found in the knowledge diffusion literature, such as Monge-Naranjo (2012), Alverez,
Buera and Lucas (2013). This assumption also helps to ensure that on BGP, the average knowledge capital per firm
is a constant and the growth rate is independent of the number of firms and the total population.
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that are i.i.d. across firms, sector-pairs and time. Its cumulative density function is given by G (ε)
with bounded support over (0, ε¯], E(εijf,t) = 1 and variance σ
2
ε .
23 Firms know the distribution of
shocks but not their actual realizations before deciding on the optimal R&D input. A series of
large adverse shocks leads to downsizing and a series of favorable ones causes further expansion.
3.2.2 Firm’s R&D, Sectoral Entry and Exit Decisions
In order to develop blueprints in any sector i ∈ J , the firm f must pay a per-period sector-specific
fixed cost of ζif,t > 0, measured in units of labor. The firm-sector specific idiosyncratic component,
ζif,t ∼ i.i.d. H
i(ζ) with support over (0,∞), mean F i and variance σiζ . This sector-specific cost of
innovation can be interpreted as legal barrier or the cost of maintaining a research lab. Since firms
have to pay the cost in every sector they innovate, the fixed costs act as barriers to diversification
in the model.
Knowledge Licensing Market To price the knowledge, we assume that there exists an efficient
and competitive licensing market for the application rights of sector-j knowledge in sector i, ∀i, j ∈
J . Should a firm decide not to innovate in sector i in a given period, it can—and find it optimal
to— license the application right of its knowledge in related sector j to another firm for adaption
during that period, assuming perfect intellectual property rights protection. In equilibrium, an
innovating firm in i would optimally obtain such rights (as the fixed costs of innovation imply
increasing returns to knowledge capital) and a non-innovating firm would optimally license such
rights. As will be shown later, the equilibrium licensing fee that clears the market of a given using
(i)-used (j) sector-pair reflects the per-period application value of sector-j knowledge to sector-i
innovation, ωij . As in standard models with competitive markets, firms in this economy take this
fee as given when making their R&D decisions. As long as such a market exists, all knowledge is
utilized in the economy—either completely utilized by its original inventor or incompletely utilized
by licensees (“incompletely” due to the aforementioned absorption cost, κ(lijf,t/z
i
f,t)) in (12).
Introducing the absorption costs is necessary, because otherwise, all firms would strictly prefer
to license its knowledge application rights to others to avoid the fixed costs of innovation. In this
case, firms’ sectoral innovation decisions would be completely random (driven solely by the random
draw of fixed costs)—as opposed to depending on its current knowledge portfolio. In addition, The
absorption friction implies that the application value for its original inventor is larger than the
application value for a licensee and hence larger than its value in the licensing market. Thus, as
long as its current knowledge portfolio generates enough expected payoff in sector i, the firm would
still prefer to continue innovating in i even though innovation incurs a fixed cost.
23A firm’s market share in a given sector may shrink, however, if its innovation rate is lower than the average
innovation rate in the sector. If a firm stops R&D in the sector, its market share will reduce to close to zero
eventually and the firm may stop innovating. In this way ‘creative destruction’ is embodied in the model.
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We acknowledge that the assumption of the existence of such licensing markets is certainly
strong, but it is an important model element for providing the basic tractability of the model. In
the presence of the complicated heterogeneities in multiple dimensions in the model, this assumption
allows all heterogeneous firms to take the sector-specific knowledge value as given in equilibrium—
as opposed to different firms bidding a different price. This allows us to focus on the interesting
questions of path-dependence of firm’s R&D decisions.
Timing A firm f begins period t with a knowledge portfolio zf,t. At the beginning of t, the firm
draws a set of the idiosyncratic shocks to fixed costs (ζif,t)i∈J . It then decides whether to conduct
R&D in each sector i ∈ J . If it innovates in i, the firm would optimally acquire more related
knowledge and decide its optimal R&D, financed by issuing equity. After that, the firm draws
invention shocks (εijf,t)i,j∈J from G(ε). ∆z
i
f,t new blueprints are then created which will generate
profit in the next period and the firm updates its knowledge capital in sector i to zif,t+1. If the
firm pauses its R&D activity in sector i at t, it continues producing and making profit using its
existing knowledge, and at the same time licenses the application rights of all its related knowledge
to firms which innovate in i. A similar process takes place in every sector, and the firm enters
period t+ 1 with a knowledge portfolio zf,t+1. Each firm compares the value of these two options
to make innovation decisions in each sector based on the realized fixed costs and its existing zft.
Knowledge Pricing Let vit denote the total market value of knowledge capital in sector i and
ωjit denote the per-period licensing fee of using sector i’s knowledge to innovate in sector j. Since all
existing knowledge is adapted to create new knowledge in this economy in every period (although
not necessarily by its original inventor), the market value of a given unit of knowledge capital is
not only given by the present discounted value of its future profits in its own sector but also by its
application values (the equilibrium licensing fees) in all sectors. Therefore,
vit
nit
=
∞∑
γ=0
1
(1 + r)γ
πit+γ +
∑
j∈J ω
ji
t+γ
nit+γ
. (13)
On the BGP, πit = π
i according to (9) and ωjit = ω
ji. Appendix B.1 proves that the number of
varieties in different sectors grow at the same constant rate njt+1/n
j
t = g. Letρ = [(1 + r)g]
−1. We
can then rewrite (13) as
vi =
1
1− ρ
(πi +
∑
j∈J
ωji). (14)
Firm’s R&D, Knowledge Acquisition and Sectoral Selection Decisions A firm, given
its existing knowledge portfolio (zf,t) and expected future value per blueprint (
vit+1
nit+1
), makes three
decisions—optimal R&D investment (Rijvf,t, R
ij
mf,t)j∈J , optimal knowledge acquisition (l
ij
f,t)j∈J and
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innovation decisions (Iif,t = {1 if innovates in i; 0 otherwise}) in every sector i. The decisions are
made by weighing the tradeoff between the expected gain from conducting research in that sector
and the value of licensing rights in sector i. Therefore, given the prices vi and ωij , the firm solves
the following maximization problem in i:
max
(Rij
vf,t
,Rij
mf,t
,lij
f,t
)j∈J ,I
i
ft

 11 + rEt(v
i∆zif,t
nit+1
)−
∑
j∈J
(Rijvf,t +R
ij
mf,t)−
∑
j∈J
ωij
lijf,t
njt
− ζif,t,
∑
j∈J
ωij
zjf,t
njt


(15)
subject to the knowledge creation function (12). Conducting research in sector i entails an re-
searcher cost (−
∑
j∈J R
ij
vf,t + R
ij
mf,t), a cost of licensing fees (
∑
j∈J ω
ij l
ij
f,t
njt
) and a fixed cost
(ζif,t). But the effort creates additional blueprints of ∆z
i
f,t, which generates a present value of
1
1+rEt(
vi∆zi
f,t
nit+1
) in expectation. On the other hand, not innovating in sector i allows the firm to col-
lect licensing fees from other firms who decide to conduct research in i with a value of
∑
j∈J ω
ij z
j
f,t
njt
.
The firm would innovate in this sector if the value of the former is larger than that of the latter.
Solving the optimization problem in (15) involves three steps. First, suppose it innovates in i,
given its private knowledge portfolio (zf,t, lf,t) and market prices for knowledge (v
i, ωij), the firm
chooses the optimal R&D investment to maximize the expected value of innovation:
λif,t = max
(Rij
v,ft
,Rij
m,ft
)j
1
1 + r
Et(
vit∆z
i
f,t
nit+1
)−
∑
j∈J
(Rijv,ft +R
ij
m,ft)−
∑
j∈J
ωijt
lijf,t
njt
− ζif,t. (16)
Solving (16) generates the optimal R&D associated with applying sector-j knowledge to sector i as
Rijf,t ≡ R
ij
v,ft +R
ij
m,ft =
α
1− α
ωˆij
[
z˜jf,t + κ(l
ij
f,t/z
i
f,t)l˜
ij
f,t + θ
¯˜zjt
]
, (17)
where z˜jf,t =
zj
ft
njt
, l˜ijf,t =
lij
f,t
njt
, ¯˜zjt =
z¯jt
njt
are the normalized own knowledge capital, acquired knowledge
and public knowledge, where
ωˆij =
1− α
α
nj
ni
(
Aijαρvi
) 1
1−α (M i)
α
α−1 . (18)
Therefore, according to (17) the firm scales up its R&D in proportion to its absorbed knowledge
capital (z˜jf,t + κ(l
ij
f,t/z
i
f,t)l˜
ij
f,t + θ
¯˜zjt ), and the proportion is governed by ωˆ
ij , which captures the
internal application value of sector j’s knowledge to innovation in sector i. ωˆij increases with the
knowledge applicability from j to i (Aij) and the market value of knowledge in sector i (vi), and
decreases with competition—the number of firms that are innovating in sector i (M i).
Second, substituting (14) and (17) to (16) and solving for the optimal amount of acquired
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knowledge (lijf,t) lead to the demand function of licensing rights:
ωij =
[
κ(
lijf,t
zjf,t
) + κ′(
lijf,t
zjf,t
)
lijf,t
zjf,t
]
ωˆij . (19)
Under the assumptions that κ(·) < 1 and κ′(·) < 0, (19) implies that (i) the market value of sector-j
knowledge in sector i is strictly less than the internal application value, i.e. ωij < ωˆij ; and that (ii)
all firms acquire external knowledge in the exact same proportion to its own knowledge and on the
BGP this proportion is constant for any given sector pair ij. Let τ ij denote the proportion, then
lijft = τ
ijzjf,t. ∀f (20)
Therefore, (19) becomes
ωij =
[
κ(τ ij) + κ′(τ ij)τ ij
]
ωˆij . (21)
Substituting (14), (17) and (21) back into (16), we can rewrite the expected value of innovation,
λif,t, as a function of τ
ij :
λif,t =
∑
j∈J
(
1− κ′(τ ij)(τ ij)2
)
ωˆij z˜jf,t + u
i − ζif,t, (22)
where ui stands for the value of public knowledge per firm, measured by the total application value
generated by public knowledge from all sectors to i:
ui =
∑
j∈J
ωˆijθ ¯˜zjt =
∑
j∈J
θωˆij
M j
. (23)
(23) says that when public knowledge is easier to adapt (higher θ), or abundant (low M j), or more
applicable (higher ωˆij), the value of public knowledge is higher.
The first term of the right-hand side of (22) implies that the value of innovating in sector i is
high when a firm’s private knowledge portfolio is highly applicable to innovation in i. Thus, the
sectoral innovation decision is path-dependent as some firms’ existing knowledge can be more easily
adapted to make new innovation than others’.
Lastly, in deciding whether to innovate in sector i, the firm compares the value of innovating
in i by itself (λif,t) against its outside option of collecting licensing fees,
∑
j∈J ω
ij z˜jf,t. Combining
(21), (22) and (15), the firm would innovate in i at t if and only if
ζif,t ≤
∑
j∈J
[1− κ(τ ij)− κ′(τ ij)τ ij(τ ij + 1)]ωˆij z˜jf,t + u
i ≡ ϕif,t, (24)
where ϕif,t is defined as the firm’s expected value of innovating in sector i. Given the property of
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the function κ(·), 1 − κ(τ ij) − κ′(τ ij)τ ij(τ ij + 1) > 0 for all τ ij > 0. Both sides of (24) contains
firm-specific variables: a firm’s existing knowledge portfolio {z˜jf,t}j∈Sf,t and its idiosyncratic fixed
costs ζif,t. Even with the same draw of {ζ
i
f,t}i, firms would still choose to innovate in different
sectors in order to best apply their existing knowledge. Other things equal, sectors with higher ui
attract more entry.
It becomes clear that without the absorption cost (i.e. κ(τ ij) = 1), ωˆij = ωij and 1− κ(τ ij)−
κ′(τ ij)τ ij(τ ij + 1) = 0. In this case, a firm would innovate in i if and only if it has a lucky draw
of fixed cost in i (i.e. ζif,t ≤ u
i). Then there would be no endogenous sorting of firms in different
sectors or path-dependent sectoral selection, as firm’s sectoral selections are guided solely by the
random draws of fixed costs, and not by its existing knowledge portfolio.
Knowledge Market Clearing The knowledge market clears for each source-application sector
pair. Given (24), we can express the fraction of sector j knowledge that is utilized by its original
inventor in i as s˜ij ≡
∫
f∈Fj H
i(ϕif,t)z˜
j
ftdf , where H
i(·) is the c.d.f. of fixed costs shocks ζift. The
supply of application rights is thus 1− s˜ij , as all knowledge that is not applied by its own inventor
in i is licensed to another innovator for one period in equilibrium. Given that all innovating firms
demand the same external-to-own knowledge ratio (τ ij), the demand for private external knowledge
amounts to τ ij s˜ij . Therefore, market clearing implies:
1− s˜ij = τ ij s˜ij . (25)
In the end, the price ωij and quantity τ ij of knowledge licensing rights are jointly determined by
(21) and (25) in equilibrium.
Newborn Firms There is a mass of prospective newborn firms in the economy, which have never
invented in any sector, i.e. z˜if,t = 0, ∀i. Therefore, in addition to sectoral entry discussed earlier
(by innovating firms in other sectors), there is also entry by these newborn firms (startups). These
firms also make a draw of ζif,t from the c.d.f. H
i(ζif,t) each period and decide whether to enter
any sectors. The same condition (24) applies to these firms, which implies that a newborn firm
enters the economy by starting from the sector where the fixed cost can be covered by absorbing
the public knowledge. Since firms have different random draws of fixed costs ζif,t, different firms
may initially enter different sets of sectors S0,f :
S0,ft =
{
i ∈ J |ui − ζif,t > 0
}
. (26)
Thus, the probability that a newborn firm would enter sector i is given by H i(ui). The fraction of
newborn firms that enter sector i is the same as the probability of entering i conditional on entering
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at least one sector of the economy; hence,
hi0 =
H i(ui)
1−Πi∈J (1−H i(ui))
, (27)
where the denominator 1 − Πi(1 − H
i(ui)) is the probability that a newborn firm enters at least
one sector. Combining (12) and (17), we derive the average (normalized) size of a newborn firm in
sector i as:
¯˜zi0 =
(1 + r)ui
(1− α)vi
. (28)
3.2.3 Sectoral Behavior
Firm Size Distribution Since varieties in the same sector are produced at the same quantity,
the normalized firm size in sector i for firm f is the same as its market share z˜jf,t. According to the
equilibrium knowledge accumulation in (11), the knowledge creation in (12) and the optimal R&D
investment in (17), firm size dynamics can be derived as follows (see Appendix B.3 for details):
z˜f,t+1 = Φf,t+1z˜f,t +Ψf,t+1b, (29)
where the K-dimensional vector z˜f,t ≡ (z˜
1
f,t, ..., z˜
K
f,t)
′, the constant vector b ≡ (θ/M1, ..., θ/MK)′,
and Φf,t and Ψf,t are K×K matrices with the (i, j)
th elements given by φijf,t and ψ
ij
f,t respectively.
Specifically,
φijf,t+1 =
[
1{if i=j}
g
+ Iif,t
(
1 + κ(τ ij)τ ij
)
ξijεijf,t
]
(30)
and
ψijf,t+1 = ξ
ijIif,t (31)
where ξij = (1+r)ωˆ
ij
(1−α)vi
, 1{if i=j} is the indicator function for i = j and the indicator variable I
i
f,t = 1
if firm f innovates in sector i at time t and zero otherwise. Iif,t = 1 with probability H
i(ϕif,t).
Note that {φijf,t+1} and {ψ
ij
f,t+1} are Markov stochastic processes representing, respectively, the
effective rate of returns (innovation rate) when applying sector-j private knowledge capital and
public knowledge capital in sector i, respectively. If {φijf,t+1} and {ψ
ij
f,t+1} were i.i.d. processes and
independent of z˜f,t, this dynamics of firm size would converge to a stationary Pareto distribution
according to Kesten (1973). However, {φijf,t+1} and {ψ
ij
f,t+1}, are endogenously determined by the
knowledge accumulation condition and by firm’s optimal R&D decisions. They depend not only on
the i.i.d. innovation shocks (εijf,t), but also on firm’s binary decision of whether or not to innovate
in sector i (Iif,t), which in turn is determined by firm’s current knowledge portfolio z˜f,t and i.i.d.
fixed cost shocks ζif,t (see Equation (24)). The latter component (I
i
f,t) implies autocorrelations in
{φijf,t+1} which captures the interesting aspect of path-dependence in firms’ innovation decisions.
It also implies that our firm dynamics in (29) is not linear in z˜f,t.
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Appendix B.3 shows that although it is not exactly linear, the firm dynamics (29) are asymp-
totically linear, a result which allows us to apply new findings in the mathematics of stochastic
recursive processes (Mirek, 2011) under appropriate assumptions. We are able to show that the
stationary firm distribution exists in the steady state and has a Pareto tail:24
Pr(z˜if > z) ∼ (
z
ki
)−µ
i
, (32)
where ki is the scale parameter and µi is the shape parameter, and Pr stands for the steady state
probability. The economics of this result is intuitive. When knowledge creation is stationary, it
accumulates additively to knowledge stock. However, since existing knowledge stock is also used in
knowledge creation process as in (12), the multiplicative process of knowledge accumulation then
leads to the Pareto tail distribution of firm size. Firms which have realized an extended series of
high positive innovation shocks and low fixed costs populate the tails in the firm size distribution.
To gain further insights on the shape of the Pareto distribution, note that the lower bound of this
distribution is associated with imitated new varieties,
∑
j ξ
ij θ
Mj
. The existence of public knowledge
(θ > 0) plays an important role in attenuating the size dispersion generated by idiosyncratic
innovation shocks such that the minimum firm size would not become too small. Suppose the Pareto
distribution also depicts the distribution of the small firms relatively well, the shape parameter µi
can then be expressed as a function of public-private knowledge value ratio:
µi = (1−
1 + r
1− α
uiM i
vi
)−1. (33)
It strictly increases with the ratio between the public knowledge value and private knowledge value
in that sector, uiM i/vi. Intuitively, a sector with a higher value of public knowledge relative to pri-
vate knowledge has a more homogeneous distribution of firm sizes, as small firms disproportionately
benefit more from the public knowledge.
The mass of firms innovating in sector i is the mass of firms which satisfies (24):
M i =M Pr
{
ϕif,t ≥ ζ
i
f,t
}
. (34)
In the stationary BGP, the mass of innovating firms is constant.
24For the stationary solution of the stochastic difference equation Yn+1 = anYn+ bn to exhibit power law behavior,
Kesten (1973) requires the multiplicative coefficients (an) to be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables. Recent works
extending Kesten (1973) include Saporta (2005) and Roitershtein (2007) which allow the stochastic coefficients to
be a finite state space Markov chain, and Hay, Rastegar and Roitershtein (2011) which allows Yn to be a multi-
dimensional variable. Stelzer (2008) proves that under certain conditions the Pareto law distribution holds with an
being a continuous state space Markov process and with multi-dimensional variables. Mirek (2011) further shows
that, for non-linear recursive processes that are approximately linear, the size distribution converges to a Pareto
distribution at the tail. For more discussions and applications of these results, see Benhabib, Bisin and Zhu (2011,
2015) in the context of wealth distribution and Luttmer (2007), Gabaix (2009) and Cai (2012) in the context of firm
size distribution in one-sector models.
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3.3 Aggregate Conditions
The population supplies L units of labor in every period which are allocated in three areas: pro-
duction workers, researchers, and workers who maintain the research labs (the fixed costs of R&D):
L =
∑
i∈J L
i
p,t +
∑
i∈J
∑
j∈J
∫
f∈F i∩Fj R
ij
f,tdf +
∑
i∈J
∫
f∈F i ζ
i
f,tdf . Using (10) and (17) we can
rewrite the above equation as:
L =
σi − 1
σi
PY +
∑
i∈J
[αρ(g − 1)vi + F iM i]. (35)
Therefore, the division of labor is also time-invariant in the BGP.
In this closed economy without physical capital, goods market clearing implies Ct = Yt. In
addition, the household owns all the firms and finances all the potential entrants. Given an interest
rate r, every period the household gets net income r
∑
i v
i from investing in firms.25 The household’s
total income is
PY = L+ r
∑
i∈J
vi. (36)
Thus, according to (9) the sectoral profit πi in the BGP is indeed a constant. Following (5), the
equilibrium interest rate is determined by
1 = β(1 + r)g
(η−1)
∑
i
si
1−σi . (37)
3.4 Equilibrium Definition
Definition 1 A stationary balanced growth path (BGP) is an equilibrium path in which output,
consumption and innovation grow at constant rates and firm size distribution is stationary in
every sector. It is given by: time paths of aggregate quantities and prices [Ct, Yt, Pt, wt, rt]
∞
t=0;
time paths of sectoral numbers of varieties, numbers of firms, quantity and price of rental applica-
tion rights and knowledge value [nit,M
i
t , τ
ij
t , ω
ij
t , v
i
t]
∞
i,j∈J ,t=0; time paths of firms’ R&D investment
[Rijf,t]
∞
i,j∈J×J ,f∈Fjt ,t=0
, number of blueprints, [zif,t]
∞
i∈J ,f∈F it ,t=0
; and time paths of firm’s sectoral
entry and exit decisions [Iif,t]
∞
i∈J ,f∈F it ,t=0
, such that:
1. Given wt, rt and Pt, the representative household maximizes life-time utility subject to an
inter-temporal budget constraint. That is, (36) and (37) are satisfied.
2. Given wt, rt and Pt, the individual firm decides on the quantity and prices of goods produced
and production labor needed. That is, (8) and (10) are satisfied.
3. Given wt, rt, Pt, {ω
ij
t }i,j∈J , and {v
i
t}i∈J , firms decide on optimal R&D investment, optimal
acquisition of external knowledge, and sectoral entry and exit decision, That is, (11), (12),
25It is equivalent to receiving dividends as profit and capital gains.
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(14), (18), (17), (21) and (23) are satisfied. A firm’s sectoral entry and exit decision is based
on (24) which also determines the number of firms in each sector.
4. Labor markets clear as in (35).
5. Goods markets clear such that Ct = Yt.
6. Knowledge markets clear as in (25).
4 Model Implications
We have commented along the way on the intuitions and insights provided by the model. With
our theory in hand, we now ask how our model can potentially fit the sector-level and firm-level
observations previously documented in Section 2 and what are the aggregate implications for long-
run growth.
4.1 Heterogeneous R&D intensity Across Sectors
We first turn to the observed positive relationship between sectoral R&D intensity and its knowledge
applicability documented in Section 2.2. According to the model, R&D intensity (R&D expenditure
as a fraction of sales) in sector i is given by RIi ≡ 1
siPY
∑
j∈J
∫
f∈F i R
ij
f df. Aggregating the optimal
R&D investment in (17) over all firms in the same sector, we obtain (see Appendix B.2 for detailed
derivation):
RIi = αρ(g − 1)
vi
siPY
, (38)
which implies
RIi
RIk
=
vi/si
vk/sk
. (39)
Thus, the model predicts that R&D resources at the aggregate are allocated across sectors propor-
tional to the knowledge value per output unit.
While vi is not directly observed in the data, a central prediction of our model is that vi depends
on its knowledge market application value ωji, which is ultimately determined by [Aij ](i,j)∈J×J .
Therefore, vi captures a similar notion to the empirical measure of applicability—and we will show
by simulation in Section 5.3 that vi and appi are indeed highly positively correlated. According
to (39) the model thereby predicts that persistent cross-sector variation in R&D intensity is an
outcome of fundamental differences in knowledge applicability, in line with the Observation 1.
4.2 Heterogenous Firm Innovation
We have shown in Section 2 that the applicability of a firm’s knowledge differs greatly, depending on
where the firm positions itself in the technology space. In addition the firm’s knowledge applicability
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is found to be systematically related to its patent stock and patent scope; more importantly, it
affects its future innovation rate. If we equate patents with innovation (knowledge creation) we can
use our model to interpret these findings.
R&D and Innovation Allocations Across Sectors To evaluate sectoral allocation of R&D
and innovation within the firm, we summarize a firm’s research effort in sector i by Rif,t =
∑
j R
ij
f,t
and its (expected) innovation in that sector by E∆z˜if,t:
Rif,t =
α
1− α
∑
j∈Sf,t
ωˆij [
(
1 + κ(τ ij)τ ij
)
z˜jf,t + θ ˜¯z
j ], (40)
E∆z˜if,t =
1
(1− α)ρ
∑
j∈Sf,t
ωˆij
vi
[
(
1 + κ(τ ij)τ ij
)
z˜jf,t + θ ˜¯z
j ]. (41)
Given (14), it is clear that ωˆ
ij
vi
strictly increases with ωˆij . At any given t, firms in the economy
differ in their existing technology portfolios (captured by {z˜jf,t}j) which is also reflected in their
technology scope (Sf,t). (40) and (41) imply that the firm allocates its innovation effort across
sectors according to the application value generated by its existing set of knowledge.
These equations help to explain Observation 2 (i.e. firms with larger patent stock or patent scope
tend to concentrate more in the applicable central sectors). To see this, consider two representative
sectors: a central sector (denoted by c) and a peripheral sector (denoted by p). A central sector
is highly connected to other sectors with many large positive values of ωˆcj , while the peripheral
sector has few sectors linked to it. When the firm’s knowledge stock increases (larger z˜jf,t in general),
the application value of its knowledge portfolio rises more for central sectors than it does for the
peripheral ones, because the coefficients ωˆcj > ωˆpj . Similarly, when a firm’s knowledge scope
expands (larger |Sf,t|), many large elements of ωˆ
cj z˜jf,t are added to R
c
f , but only a few elements of
ωˆpj z˜jf,t are added to R
p
f . Therefore, R
c
f/R
p
f and ∆z˜
c
f/∆z˜
p
f both increase with the firm’s knowledge
stock and knowledge scope, consistent with the Observation 2.
4.2.1 Sequential Sectoral Entry
Sequential sectoral entry (Observation 3) can be better illustrated by first considering a simplified
case in which every firm faces the same fixed cost F (i.e. no idiosyncratic fixed cost risk, ζif = F ).
In this case, free entry by newborn firms implies that entry stops when the net value of entry is
zero. That is, maxi{u
i} = F . The sector that offers the maximum public knowledge value is the
first sector that every new firm enters. This condition along with the sectoral entry/exit condition
(24) implies that firms enter different sectors sequentially : they start developing blueprints in a
sector that offers the largest public knowledge value, build up their private knowledge and gradually
venture into other sectors using their accumulated knowledge capital.
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Figure III explains this pattern of sequential sectoral entry. Suppose sectors are ranked by their
value of public knowledge as u1 > u2 > ... > uK . The horizontal line of fixed costs (F ) intersects
with u1 according to the free entry condition of newborn firms. Every newborn firm enters sector
1 first in this scenario of no idiosyncratic risks ζif . In order to enter more sectors, the firm then
needs to accumulate more private knowledge to fill up the gap between the fixed cost and the value
of public knowledge (denoted by ∆i = F −u
i). As in (24) when the private knowledge value covers
the gap ∆i, the firm enters another sector i.
Figure III: Determination of Firm’s Entry into Multiple Sectors
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We note that in our more general setup, firms face idiosyncratic shocks to innovation and fixed
costs. Hence, not all firms follow the exact same path expanding across the technology space.
However, their entries are path-dependent: depending on which sectors they have entered and are
actively conducting research in, the inter-sectoral knowledge linkages help to direct the next optimal
step. This is one of the features that distinguish our model from others in the literature.
4.2.2 Innovation Rate
In Observation 4, controlling for firm size, firms possessing highly applicable knowledge subse-
quently tend to innovate faster. A firm innovates by both expanding across sectors and creating
new blueprints in the existing sectors, the overall innovation rate (in expectation) can be captured
in the model by gf,t+1 = E
∑
i∈J ∆z˜
i
f,t
∑
i∈J z˜
j
f,t
, which in equilibrium can be derived as:
gf,t+1 =
1
(1− α)ρ
∑
j∈Sf,t
sjf,t
∑
i∈Sf,t
ωˆij
vi
, (42)
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where sjf,t = (
(
1 + κ(τ ij)τ ij
)
z˜jf,t + θ ˜¯z
j)/
∑
j∈J 1 z˜
j
f,t and can be broadly interpreted as firm’s allo-
cation of patents across sectors (if θ is small).
(42) implies that a firm’s innovation rate (i.e. the growth rate of its blue prints) depends on the
firm’s existing knowledge distribution. Firms that concentrate more in highly applicable knowledge
(reflected in a high positive correlation between sjf and
∑
i∈Sf,t
ωˆij
vi
) are able to develop new products
faster, as applicable sectors offer extensive knowledge spillovers to other sectors, leading to higher
firm growth. This is in line with the Observation 4.
Although it is not the focus of this paper, (42) also explains why firm innovation rate decreases
with its patent stock but increases with its patent scope as shown in Table VI. The model predicts
that a larger firm which has already accumulated large amount of private knowledge, innovates
more slowly because it benefits less from the public knowledge. On the other hand, expansive
knowledge scope—reflected by a larger set Sf,t—allows the firm to utilize and apply knowledge
from more sectors, and hence increases its overall innovation rate.
4.3 Innovation Allocation and Aggregate Growth
What are the aggregate implications of growth generated by the model? As in standard variety
expanding models, real output growth is driven by the “variety effects”: expansion in varieties is
associated with a decrease in goods prices. Therefore, real output growth strictly increases with
the innovation rate. Define δij as the fraction of j’s knowledge (including both private and public)
that is eventually absorbed and utilized in innovation in sector i:
δij = s˜ij + κ(τ ij)(1− s˜ij) + θ
M i
M j
. (43)
Summing up all firm’s accumulated knowledge in (12), we can derive the (gross) growth rate of the
number of varieties in the whole economy in the BGP equilibrium as:
g = (1− β)
[
(1− α)β
∑
i∈J π
i +
∑
i∈J
∑
j∈J ωˆ
ij∑
i∈J
∑
j∈J ωˆ
ijδij
− 1
]−1
. (44)
See Appendix B.2 for details of derivation.
This equation provides three insights. First, everything else being the same, strengthening
knowledge linkages across sectors enhances growth (because ωˆij increases). Second, in the presence
of fixed costs, not every firm innovates in every sector. Therefore, the fraction of private knowledge
that is used across sectors s˜ij+κ(τ ij)(1− s˜i), ∀i, j, is strictly less than one (full utilization of knowl-
edge across sectors). Hence, (44) implies that sectoral fixed costs reduce the aggregate innovation
rate in the economy by blocking the knowledge circulation across sectors.
Third and more interestingly, when a firm’s sectoral selection decision is dictated more by the
“luck” factor (i.e. a firm innovates sector i whenever it has a draw of low fixed cost in i) and
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less by the “fundamental” knowledge linkages, ωˆij and δij become less correlated. Firms with
sufficient background knowledge may not be able to conduct research in many sectors, while firms
with insufficient background knowledge may enter many sectors but cannot innovate much. This
random sorting of firms in different sectors—manifested in low
∑
i
∑
j ωˆ
ijδij—reduces aggregate
innovation rate. Thus, the uncertainty in the fixed costs of research generates an additional negative
“resource misallocation effect” on aggregate growth—a new insight yielded by the model.
Scale-Free Growth Jones (1999) first pointed out that the “scale effects” that exist in many
endogenous growth models are not consistent with empirical evidence. By assuming the efficiency
of R&D workers to be proportional to the average knowledge stock in that sector, we eliminate the
“scale effects” of population on economic growth. As shown by (14), (18), (21), (35) and (36), πi,
ωˆij , ωij , vi, M i and PY are all proportional to the total population (L) in the economy, while δij
does not change with L. Therefore, according to (44), aggregate innovation rate is independent of
the population size.
5 Simulation
Although much of the equilibrium can be characterized by closed form expressions that provide
useful intuitions and implications, matching the model’s predictions to our empirical observations
quantitatively requires solving the full general equilibrium, which in turn relies on a knowledge of
joint distribution of firm’s expected gains of sectoral entry ϕif,t and firm size z˜
i
f,t that cannot be
derived analytically. Therefore, in this section we simulate the model economy with a large panel
of firms (70,000) innovating in various multiple sectors and assess the performance of the model
in matching the empirical observations that motivated our work. A counterfactual experiment is
conducted in the end to examine the role of sector-specific fixed innovation costs on aggregate
growth.
Since it is computationally costly to simulate a large number of sectors, in this section we
consider the same 42 SIC sectors as those examined in Section 2.2. NBER firm patenting data and
patent citation data over the same set of sectors during 1976-2006 are employed to discipline the
parameters.
5.1 Estimation of Parameters
We assume that idiosyncratic shocks to fixed innovation costs in sector i are drawn from a Gamma
distribution H i(ζ) with mean F i and variance σiζ , and shocks to firms’ innovation are drawn from
a Gamma distribution G(ε) with mean one and variance σε and ε ∈ (0, ε¯]. We set the absorption
capacity function to κ(τ ij) =
(
1 + bτ ij
)−a
, where 1 ≥ a > 0, b > 0.26 The set of parameters of the
26This functional form ensures that the market application value ωij is positive according to (21).
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model to be calibrated include elements of the intersectoral knowledge diffusion matrix [Aij ]i×j∈J×J
and {β, η, α, θ, a, b, σi, si, F i, σiζ , σε}. We explain in turn how to estimate each of these parameters.
Inter-sectoral Knowledge Diffusion Matrix A We proxy the knowledge linkages by the
fraction of citations made to sector j by sector i (knowledge flow from j to i). Since sectors
with more patents tend to be cited more frequently, we normalize this fraction of citations by the
relative importance of sector j, measured by the share of citations received by j in total citations
(citationsharej). Formally,
A˜ij =
no. of citations from i to j/total citations made by i
citationsharej
. (45)
Figure IV shows a contour graph of the knowledge diffusion matrix (in log) for these 42 sectors
ranked by their applicability (a lower sector index indicates higher applicability). The darker color
signals a larger element in A. The contour graph shows that sectors with high knowledge applica-
bility are densely linked to each other, whereas less applicable sectors are loosely connected to only
a few other sectors. The darkest area on the diagonal reflects the fact that a large proportion of
citations go to patents in the same sector. This is not particularly surprising given that sectors in
this case are not highly disaggregated; however, most sectors also allocate a significant number of ci-
tations to patents from other sectors, reflecting the importance of cross-sector knowledge spillovers.
We normalize the knowledge diffusion matrix by a scale parameter, A0, such that A
ij = A0 × A˜
ij .
A0 governs the average innovation rate.
Figure IV: Contour Graph of Knowledge Diffusion Across Sectors
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Note: The figure represents the knowledge diffusion matrix constructed from the NBER Patent Citation data for 42
SIC sectors. A darker color implies that the sector is cited by another at a higher rate.
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Other Parameters Total labor force, L, is normalized to 100, and we choose the following
standard values: the growth rate of real output is 2%, the interest rate r = 5% and β = 0.99.
The average annual (gross) growth rate of patents, g, equals 1.11 as in the data (for the period
1976-2006). (5) then implies that the household’s risk aversion parameter η = 3. The sectoral
elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods σi is set to match the estimates provided
in Broda and Weinstein (2006). The production share, si, is estimated using the sectoral output
data provided by NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. To save space, the values of
sector-specific parameters are relegated to Table A.4 in Appendix B.4.
The equilibrium conditions characterized in previous sections are employed to estimate some
of model parameters, ϑ ≡ {A0, α, θ, a, b, v
i, F i, σiζ}, using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM). The collated complete set of equilibrium conditions are listed in Appendix B.5. In the
patent dataset we observe all firms’ patent stock and patent applications in 42 sectors in 1997 (as-
suming the economy is on the BGP in that year): {(S1f , S
2
f , ...S
42
f )}f∈F and {(P
1
f , P
2
f , ...P
42
f )}f∈F .
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Based on these observations, we calculate the relative patent stock across sectors (corresponding
to {ni/nj}ij in the model), the fraction of innovating firms in each sector ({M
i/M}i), the share of
firms that patent in s number of different sectors ({M s/M}s), the average share of patents applied
by new patentees in sector i ({¯˜zi0}i), the fraction of new patentees that enter sector i ({h
i
0}i) and
the fraction of patents in j that are owned by firms innovating in sector i in that year, {s˜ij}ij .
Then according to (25) τ ij is estimated as (1 − s˜ij)/s˜ij . In addition, we obtain the ratio between
the number of firms and total population, M/L, from Axtell (2011).
We set general equilibrium conditions (14), (27), (28), (34), (36), (38), (42) and the equilibrium
share of firms that simultaneously innovate in s sectors as our targeted moments. (14), (36) and (38)
underpin sectoral knowledge values. (27), (34) and firms co-patenting help to determine parameters
governing the distribution of shocks to fixed innovation costs {F i, σiζ}i. (27) and (28) concerning
newborn firms entry pin down the imitation parameter θ. (42) guarantees that every sector grows
at the same rate as the model predicted.
More specifically, we substitute the empirical observation of ni/nj , Aij ,M i/M, ¯˜zi0, h
i
0, τ
ij ,M/L
into the above equations. Define Γ(ϑ) as the vector of differences between data moments and
model-generated moments. Our GMM estimators solve:
ϑˆ = argmin
ϑ
Γt(ϑ)W
−1
ϑ Γt(ϑ)
′, (46)
in which Wϑ is a diagonal weighting matrix with weight being one for all sectoral moments. Once
calibrated parameter set ϑˆ is available, the empirically unobserved licensing fees {ωij}ij and public
knowledge value {ui}i can be backed out using (18), (21) and (23).
27We only keep firms which have filed for at least one patent during the five year period of 1993-1997. Although
many firms do not apply for patent every year, the probability of a firm to resume patenting after being inactive for
five years is very small.
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Our estimated α = 0.245, implying a significant input from R&D researchers in the knowledge
creation process. The imitation efficiency parameter θ captures how much on average a firm can
learn from the public knowledge pool per period, where the size of public knowledge pool is measured
by the average firm size. θ = 0.002 implies that every period 0.2% of an average firm’s knowledge
capital is available to every firm, which is quite substantial for small firms relative to their own
knowledge stock.28 a = 1.058 and b = 4.6 × 103, implying that the absorption capacity κ(τ ij) =(
1 + bτ ij
)−a
≪ 1 for large values of τ ij . A0 = 0.014 and parameters related to sector-specific
fixed costs of innovation {F i, σiζ}i are reported in Table A.4. The estimated average fixed costs
are sensible: the three sectors with the highest costs are guided missiles and space vehicles, ship
and boat building, ordinance except missiles, and the three sectors with the lowest costs include
professional and scientific instruments, electronic components, and general industry machinery and
equipment. Lastly, the variance of the innovation shocks σ2ε= 0.2 so that the variance of the total
firm size distribution in the simulation matches that in the data.
5.2 Goodness of Fit at Sectoral Level
We now show how well our model fits the data by comparing the model’s targeted and untargeted
moments with their empirical counterparts. All numbers reported are in log-scale. First, we look
at the moments that we targeted in our GMM estimation. The upper-left penal of Figure V plots
the cross-sector observations of the model-generated share of firms in sector i, M i/M , and the
empirical share of firms in corresponding sectors, together with a 45-degree line signaling a perfect
fit. The correlation between the two is as high as 0.96. The upper-right panel plots the share of
firms that simultaneously patent in s number of sectors (Ms/M) and its empirical counterpart,
the correlation is also high at 0.95. The lower two panel compares the model-generated average
newborn size per sector (¯˜zi0) and the model-generated entry probability of a potential newborn firm
(hi0) with their respective empirical counterparts. The correlations are 0.54 and 0.99, respectively.
Next, we examine our model’s performance in terms of three moments that were not targeted in
GMM. This includes R&D allocation, Ri/R, which is predicted from (39), the external knowledge to
own knowledge ratio, τ ij , which has a one-to-one relationship with the share of sector j knowledge
that is used sector i, s˜ij , according to (25), and the new knowledge capital created by each firm,
∆z˜if,t, according to (12).
The left panel of Figure VI compares the model-implied share of R&D expenditure across sectors
with the empirical sectoral R&D share (correlation=0.61). We also find a significant and positive
28For example, the average total patent stock is 32 during 1976-2006, while the smallest firm has only one patent.
Therefore acquiring 0.2% of the average firm’s knowledge capital by imitation increases its own knowledge capital by
about 6.5%, which is sizable for small firms. In addition, when comparing the cross-firm citations per patent with
self-citations per patent by calculating the ratio=(cross-firm citationf,t/
∑
k 6=f Sk,t)/(self-citationsf,t/Sf,t), we find
that the average ratio is 0.07% in 1997. This implies that on average firms utilize way more private knowledge than
public knowledge, consistent with our estimation.
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Figure V: Targeted Moments (log scale)
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Notes: These figures compare the model generated variables of interest (y-axis) with their empirical counterparts
(x-axis). M i/M is the fraction of firms innovate in sector i, Ms/M is the fraction of firms that innovate in s number
of sectors (firms co-patenting pattern), hi0 stands for the fraction of newborn firms that enter sector i.
correlation between τ ij predicted by the model and its empirical counterparts (correlation=0.66),
presented in the right panel. Lastly, although not reported in the figure, the model-implied new
knowledge created and the empirical number of new patent applications are highly correlated at
0.83.
These results indicate that the model performs well in generating cross-sector differences in
R&D investment, firms co-patenting, cross-sector knowledge utilization and knowledge creation at
firm level.
5.3 Model-Predicted Knowledge Value and Empirical Applicability Measure
We have commented throughout the model how the cross-sector differences in vi and ui/F i explain
the observed sector-level and firm-level facts. While these variables are not directly observable in
the data, the model predicts that they are all driven by the fundamental heterogeneity of knowledge
linkages across sectors, suggesting a positive relationship between vi, ui and the empirical measure
of applicability. Figure VII plots the estimated vi and ui/F i against the empirical measure of
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Figure VI: Untargeted Moments (log scale)
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technology applicability constructed in Section 2. It shows that both vi and ui are indeed highly
positively correlated with sectoral knowledge applicability (appi). The correlation between the
estimated log(vi) and log(appi) is 0.89. The correlation between the estimated log(ui/F i) and
log(appi) is 0.67, suggesting that highly applicable sector does also provide highly valuable public
knowledge that attracts small firms with little private knowledge capital to enter.
Figure VII: Model-Generated Knowledge Value and Empirical Measure of Applicability (log scale)
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5.4 Simulated Firm-level Observations
The observation that the applicability of a firm’s existing technology matters for its innovation
activity is one of the key observations that motivates the presence of inter-sectoral knowledge
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linkages in our model. We have discussed previously in the text how our model might potentially
explain these facts. This section presents the simulated observations to show that the model
indeed can account for the firm-level observations. To obtaining comparability, we re-generate
empirical observations in Section 2 using 42 sectors (instead of 428 Nclasses) and compare these
with the model-generated observations. Details on the simulation algorithms are provided in the
Computational Appendix C.
Knowledge Stock, Knowledge Scope and Technology Applicability Figure VIII provides
a graphical comparison of the model-implied relationship between firm’s technology applicability
and its knowledge stock/scope with the empirical relationship. Similarly to Figure II in Section 2, all
firms are divided into 20 bins according to their knowledge stock (patent stock in the data) in the left
panel or according to their numbers of sectors in the right panel. The graphs show that the model is
able to replicate closely how a firm’s knowledge stock and knowledge cope matter for its technology
allocation and entry. In line with the Observation 2 in Figure II, our simulation shows that
firm’s technology applicability (weighted average applicability of its technologies using applicability
calculated for these 42 sectors) increases with its total number of innovations (knowledge stock)
and its number of sectors (knowledge scope), while the knowledge applicability of its new sectors
is negatively related to both. As the firm accumulates knowledge in many related sectors, it can
slowly afford to enter peripheral sectors which have weaker knowledge linkages with its existing
sectors. Therefore when taking a snapshot of the innovation outcome across firms, larger firms
with more knowledge stock tend to enter sectors closer to the periphery.
Figure VIII: Firm’s Technology Applicability, Knowledge Stock and Multi-Technology Innovation
(log scale)
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Notes: Similarly to Section 2, the large number of simulated firms are divided into 20 bins and observations are based
on an average firm in each bin.
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Firm Innovation Rate and Initial Technology Applicability Using simulated data from
the last 40 periods, we examine the relationship between firm’s initial TAf and its subsequent
innovation rate based on the regression specification in (3). Robust standard errors are reported,
observations are clustered at the firm level. The result is given as:
gf,t = −0.061
(0.001)∗∗∗
log(Sf,t−1) + 0.002
(0.000)∗∗∗
log(Nf,t−1) + 0.005
(0.001)∗∗∗
TAf,t−1 + µf + ηt + υf,t. (47)
Replacing the overall innovation rate by the intensive innovation rate and the extensive innovation
rate as the dependent variable, we have the following regression results:
ginf,t = −0.023
(0.001)∗∗∗
log(Sf,t−1) + 0.001
(0.000)∗∗
log(Nf,t−1)−0.001
(0.001)
TAf,t−1 + µf + ηt + υf,t, (48)
gexf,t = −0.037
(0.001)∗∗∗
log(Sf,t−1) +0.002
(0.000)∗∗∗
log(Nf,t−1) + 0.006
(0.001)∗∗∗
TAf,t−1 + µf + ηt + υf,t. (49)
Again, the results using simulated data are consistent with empirical observations. It is evident that
the model replicates the empirical observation that firms’ innovation rates, more so for extensive
growth rates, are positively related to the applicability of their initial technological position. A
more central positioning in the technology space opens more potential routes for a firm to expand
across sectors, thus boosting the overall firm innovation rate.
5.5 Counterfactual Experiments: the Role of Fixed Costs of Innovation
One of the new insights gained from the model, as discussed in Section 4.3, is that the fixed costs of
innovation in every sector potentially has negative growth impact through their “knowledge under-
utilization effect” and “R&D misallocation effect”. In this section, we explore the quantitatively
implication of raising the mean and standard deviation of the shocks to fixed R&D costs using
counterfactual experiments. The technical procedure of this exercise is given in Appendix C.2. The
counterfactual results are presented in Table VII.
In the first experiment, we double the size of the average fixed cost, F ii , in all sectors. Since
the barrier to conduct R&D is now higher, fewer firms would innovate in each sector (smaller M i)
and those that innovate would simultaneously innovate in fewer sectors (smaller M s). The average
number of sectors per firm drops from the baseline 0.76 to 0.51. Cross-sector knowledge application
sightly decreased with the average sij falling from 0.50 to 0.49. The correlation between cross-sector
knowledge licensing share δij and knowledge linkages ωij also decrease, from 0.50 in the baseline
to 0.28. As a consequence, aggregate innovation rate, g, falls from 11% to 9.3%. Meanwhile,
overall firm size distribution becomes even more homogeneous: The standard deviation of log-scale
(normalized) total firm size
∑
i z˜
i
f,t decreases from 2.58 to 0.53. This is because relatively large firms
with applicable background knowledge find it harder to enter new sectors and grow further, as the
per sector fixed costs of R&D rise. Because the peripheral sectors’ F is are higher than those of the
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central sectors to begin with, when doubling all F i, the likelihood to enter drops disproportionally
more in the peripheral sectors.
In the second experiment, we quintuple the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks to sectoral
fixed costs, σς , while keeping the average number of sectors per firm the same. Firms now are
distributed more evenly across sectors (less cross-sectoral variation in M i). Cross-sector knowledge
application dramatically decreased, reflected in an significant drop in the average sij (from 0.50 to
0.08). Meanwhile, the correlation between log-scaled cross-sector knowledge licensing share δij and
knowledge linkage ωij falls to 0.11, because the sectoral selection is less based on firm’s background
of knowledge and the associated applicability and more on luck. Eventually, growth rate is lower,
dropping from 11% to 1.6%. Moreover, firm size distribution becomes more homogeneous, with
the standard deviation of log-scale firm size lowering from 2.58 to 1.73. This is simply an outcome
of sectoral selection becoming more random. Large firms with more related knowledge capital are
less likely to keep their position and expand.
Table VII: Counterfactual Experiments
Scenario M¯ s s¯ij ρ¯(log δij , logωij) σ¯(log(
∑
i z˜
i
f,t)) g
Baseline 0.76 0.50 0.51 2.58 1.11
2F i 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.53 1.09
5σζ 0.76 0.08 0.11 1.73 1.02
6 Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Research
Technological advances are complementary and sequential; interconnections between them are,
however, highly heterogeneous. Our goal is to forge a link between observations of firm innovation
in multiple technologies and theories of aggregate technological progress. We provide a theoretical
framework which builds on micro-level observations and helps to elucidate how innovating firms
choose to position themselves in the technology space and allocate their R&D investment. We have
attempted to demonstrate that our model can replicate key firm-level facts; as such, the resulting
aggregate model is likely to provide a more credible tool for policy analysis. As an example, in two
counterfactual experiments, we show that both larger fixed costs and higher degree of randomness
in the fixed costs shocks reduce growth by lowering the correlation between cross-sector knowledge
utilization and the underlying knowledge linkages.
Our study has important implications for economic growth and R&D policies. First, govern-
ment policies directed at stimulating innovation in certain technologies need to be based on better
understanding of the inter-sectoral knowledge linkages. Heterogenous sectoral knowledge spillovers
suggest that industrial or R&D policies that favor highly applicable sectors may boost growth.
In a related cross-country study, Cai and Li (2013) find that countries which specialize more in
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applicable technologies tend to grow faster. Second, policies that lower barriers to diversification
help to reinforce the effect of industrial policies, as it can be challenging to shift to more advanced
industries given the fixed cost of learning and adapting knowledge in new sectors, and more di-
versification encourages spillovers between different technologies. Third, competition policies that
encourage joint R&D ventures in highly related sectors can benefit growth, because firms are better
able to internalize knowledge spillovers.
One direction for future research is to relax the assumption of an efficient and competitive
knowledge licensing market, which is assumed in this paper to allow for the basic tractability of the
model. Relaxing this assumption would introduce another type of heterogeneity in that innovating
firms would bid a firm-specific price for a given knowledge capital depending on the set of sectors
that a firm innovates in. This is certainly an intriguing case. If firms price the same knowledge stock
differently, a current all-sector firm is likely to bid a higher price as it is able to apply knowledge in
greater scope. Therefore, large firms is likely to invest relatively more in R&D and are more active in
the knowledge market than small firms. In equilibrium, small firms would find it difficult to survive
and expand, but once succeed, they are more likely to defend their status. The firm dynamics
would become more persistent and the firm size distribution is likely to be more heterogeneous.
A greater share of knowledge stock would then be concentrated in a few superstar firms who are
able to apply it in almost all sectors. Unfortunately, this scenario is not feasible computationally in
the current setup given the already complicated heterogeneity in multiple dimensions (i.e. at the
sector level, at the sector-pair level, at the firm level and at the firm-sector level). Each firm is a
multi-dimensional vector as it creates various numbers of blueprints in multiple sectors. Therefore
the total number of state vectors is extremely large, implying an enormous size of the transition
matrix across different states. If realistic features of inefficient and illiquid knowledge markets were
to be incorporated in this model, one needs to make other assumptions to reduce the dimensions
of heterogeneity, such as allowing for random and exogenous arrival of new innovation. However
such a setup would not be able to explain the endogenous and path-dependent sectoral selection
in firm’s R&D allocation decisions, which is the focus and novelty of this paper, but could be an
interesting venue for future exploration.
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A Empirics Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
Firm Patenting and Patent Citations We use patent applications in the 2006 edition of the
NBER Patent Citation Data (see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001 for details) to characterize
firms’ innovation activities. We use their citations to trace the direction and intensity of knowledge
flows and to construct indices of knowledge linkages among sectors. The data provides detailed
information of every patent granted by the United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) and
their citations from 1976 to 2006. We summarize each firm’s patent stock in each disaggregated
technological class (intensive margin of innovation) and the number of categories (extensive margin
of innovation) for each year.
Each patent corresponds to one of the 428 3-digit United States Patent Classification System
(USPCS) technological classes and also one of more than 800 7-digit International Patent Clas-
sification (IPC) classes. Figure I presents the intersectoral network corresponding to the patent
citation share matrix for 428 technological category. We mostly report the results based on USPCS
codes, but we check for robustness using the IPC classes. We also present some evidence based on
industrial sector classification, as the model is estimated based on this categorization. To translate
the data into the industrial classifications, we use the 2005 edition of the concordance table pro-
vided by the USPTO to map USPCS into SIC72 (Standard Industrial Classification in 1972) codes,
which constructs 42 industrial sectors.29 We summarize citations made to patents that belong to
the same technological class and use the cross-sector citations to form the intersectoral knowledge
spillover network.
Firm R&D Data Information on firm sizes (i.e. sales) and firm’s R&D expenditure is from the
U.S. Compustat database. Firm-level R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenditure divided by
sales. We consider three measures of the industry-level R&D intensity: industry aggregate R&D
expenditure divided by industry aggregate sales, median firm R&D intensity and average firm R&D
intensity.
A.2 Robustness of Empirical Observations
Time-variant Measure of Applicability In order to capture the fundamental long-run linkages
between different technological fields, we construct the sector-specific measure of applicability using
30-year pooled patent citation data. However, knowledge linkages may be formed due to the state
of scientific knowledge at a certain point in time and thus may change over time. Especially, the
interconnectedness of technologies relevant to firms may also be time-varying. To test if this concern
29The patents are classified according to either the intrinsic nature of the invention or the function for which the
invention is used or applied. It is inherently difficult to allocate the technological category to economically relevant
industries in a differentiation finer than 42 sectors, even with detailed firm level information. First, most of the
patents are issued by multi-product firms that are present in multiple SIC-4 industries. Second, in the best scenario,
one only has industry information about the origin of the patents but not the industry to which the patent is actually
applied.
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would affect our observation, we compute a rolling-window based measure of applicability for each
sector, log(appit) using data from [t−10, t−1], and run the same regressions using this time-variant
applicability. The results are reported in Column “Time-variant” in the following Tables A.1–A.3,
corresponding to the original results in Table IV –VI in Section 2.
Quality-Adjusted Measure of Applicability Not all patents are created equal. The economic
impacts of individual patented inventions have demonstrated large heterogeneity (Hall et al. 2007,
Harhoff et al. 1999). To handle this concern, we follow the suggestion by Hall et al. (2007)
and use forward citations received by a patent as a proxy for its quality to adjust our measure
of applicability. Specifically, when calculating aw using (1), we weigh a citation from patent p in
sector j by the number of forward citations received by p. That is, W ij =
∑
p∈{patents citing i}C
j
p ,
where Cjp is the number of forward citations received by p and p is a patent in sector j. For example,
if patent p received 5 forward citations, then its citation weight count as 5 instead of 1. In this way,
the citation received from a patent which itself is well-cited counts more. Column “Quality-adj” in
Tables A.1–A.3 reports results using this measure.
Depreciated Patent Stock The R&D literature often assumes that R&D capital stocks depre-
ciate (with a typical annual rate of 15%) (e.g. Hall et al. (2005)). In our paper, patent stock is
used as a measure for firm’s knowledge stock. Although it is also possible for ideas to depreciate,
the paper does not assume physical depreciation of knowledge—as that would imply that some
knowledge is exogenously forgotten. However the model does allow for economic depreciation as
knowledge can become less valuable (lower market share) when newer knowledge accumulates in
the same sector. Nevertheless, to test that if depreciation of knowledge capital would change our
empirical results, we assume the same 15% depreciation rate to recalculate firm’s patent stock, i.e.
Sf,t = 0.85 × Sf,t−1 + Pf,t and reconstruct firms’ knowledge portfolio. Column “Depreciated Sf”
in Tables A.1–A.3 presents the results.
Overall, all our firm-level observations are robust to these alternative measure of applicability
or firms’ knowledge portfolio.
48
Table A.1: Robustness: Firm’s Innovation Allocation
Dependent Variable: TAf,t Time-variant Quality-Adjusted Depreciated Sf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Sf,t−1) 0.137 0.0056 -0.000
(0.006)** (0.007)** (0.004)
log(Nf,t−1) 0.114 0.127 0.039
(0.008)** (0.010)** (0.007)**
Dependent: TAnewsecf,t−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Sf,t−1) -0.252 -0.274 -0.310
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.003)**
log(Nf,t) -0.381 -0.421 -0.330
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.004)**
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported, with robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering by firms in brackets. Sample covers every year between 1976 and 2006. ** and * indicate
significance at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively.
Table A.2: Robustness: Firm’s Sectoral Entry Selections
Dependent Variable: log(appif,t) Time-variant Quality-Adjusted Depreciated Sf
(1) (2)
Newsecif,t 0.044 0.036 0.052 0.053 0.018 0.061
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.006)**
log(Sf,t−1) 0.094 0.029 -0.049
(0.007)** (0.009)* (0.005)**
Newsecif,t × log(Sf,t−1) -0.070 -0.069 -0.108
(0.002)** (0.003) (0.004)**
log(Nf,t−1) 0.102 0.046 0.107
(0.010)** (0.012)** (0.008)**
Newsecif,t × log(Nf,t−1) -0.094 -0.100 -0.160
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)**
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions include firm and year fixed effects. Regression coefficients are reported, with robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering by firms in brackets. Sample covers every year between 1976 and 2006. ** and * indicate
significance at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively.
Table A.3: Robustness: Firm Innovation Rate
Dependent Variable: g Time-variant Quality-Adjusted Depreciated Sf
Main Selection Main Selection Main Selection
TAf,t−1 0.033 0.048 0.054 0.057 0.111 0.047
(0.002)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.005)** (0.003)**
log(Sf,t−1) -0.345 1.065 -0.339 1.068 -0.353 1.043
(0.006)** (0.010)** (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.013)** (0.006)**
log(Nf,t−1) 0.131 0.113 0.128 0.109 0.636 0.544
(0.007)** (0.013)** (0.007)** (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.009)**
age -0.067 -0.067 -0.022
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)**
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Regressions are based on Heckman two-step procedure and include firm and year fixed effects. Regression
coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by firms in brackets. Sample covers every
year between 1976 and 2006. ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively.
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B Technical Appendix
B.1 Identical Innovation Rates Across Sectors
This section shows that on the BGP, the innovation rates across sectors are the same (i.e. g = gi,
∀i), as long as the intersectoral knowledge linkage A = [Aij ]i×j∈J×J satisfies the following condition:
∃Aij > 0, ∀i. That is, every sector is applying knowledge from at least another sector.
Based on the knowledge accumulation equation (11) and (12), the evolution of the number of
blueprints in sector i can be derived as:
nit+1 = n
i
t +
∫
f∈F it
△zif,tdf
= nit +
∑
j∈J
(Aij)
1
1−α
(
αρivi
M i
) α
1−α

 ∫
f∈F it
((1 + κijτ ij)zjf,t + θz¯
j
t )df


= nit +
(
αβvi
giM i
) α
1−α ∑
j∈J
(Aij)δijnjt (B.1)
where δij = s˜ij + κij(1 − s˜ij) + θM
i
Mj
stands for the fraction of knowledge in sector j (including
both private and public) that is ultimately utilized in innovation in sector i. It comprises of three
component: s˜ij =
∫
f∈F H
i(ϕif )z˜
j
fdf is the fraction of private sector-j knowledge that are used by
its own inventor in sector i, κij(1 − s˜ij) is the fraction of sector-j private knowledge that are
acquired and absorbed by other firms who innovate in sector i, and the last term in the last
bracket (θM
i
Mj
) represents the fraction public knowledge in sector j that is utilized for innovation in
sector i. All components are constant in the BGP. Since acquired knowledge is not fully absorbed,
s˜ij + κij(1− s˜ij) ≤ 1.
Rearranging the terms in (B.1), we have:
(gi − 1)(gi)
α
1−α =
(
αβvi
M i
) α
1−α ∑
j∈J
(
Aij
) 1
1−α
[
s˜ij + κij(1− s˜ij) + θ
M i
M j
]
njt
nit
. (B.2)
Now suppose that sector i had been growing more slowly than other sectors for a lengthy period,
its number of goods would be extremely small relative to other sectors. (B.2) implies that the
cross-sector knowledge spillovers would increase gi tremendously through a large ratio of njt/n
i
t
until gi is the same as the innovation rates in other sectors. And vice versa for sectors starting
with a faster growth rate than others. Therefore, in the BGP, gi = gj = g. Since the number of
varieties innovated grow at the same rate across sectors, njt/n
i
t is constant. That is,
nit
njt
=
ni
nj
, ∀t.
Thus the distribution of sector sizes is stable and rank-preserving. Intuitively, the number of goods
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in every sector grows at the same speed, because inter-sector knowledge linkages keep all sectors
on the same track.
B.2 Deriving Aggregate Growth Rate and Cross-Sector Research Intensity
Given that all sectors grow at the same rate, we can rewrite (B.2) as
g = 1 +
∑
j∈J
ωˆijδij
(1− α)ρvi
, (B.3)
Based on (14), we can rewrite the equation above as:
g = 1 +
(1− ρ)
(1− α)ρ
∑
j∈J
∑
j∈J ωˆ
ijδij∑
j∈J π
i +
∑
j∈J
∑
j∈J ωˆ
ij
. (B.4)
Substituting out ρ = β/g leads to (44) after rearranging the terms.
The sectoral research intensity is defined as the overall sectoral R&D expenditure divided by
sectoral revenue: RIi ≡ 1
siPY
∑K
j=1
∫
f∈F i∩Fj R
ij
f df. Substitute the optimal R&D expenditure (17)
and (B.3) into the equation, we have:
RIi =
α
1− α
1
siPY
∑
j∈J
ωˆij
∫
f∈F i [
(
1 + κijτ ij
)
zjf,t + θ
j z¯jt ]df
njt
=
α
1− α
1
siPY
∑
j∈J
ωˆijδij .
Combining the above equation with (B.3) yields the R&D intensity in sector i:
RIi = αρ(g − 1)
vi
siPY
. (B.5)
Therefore,
RIi
RIk
=
vi/si
vk/sk
,
B.3 The Evolution of (Normalized) Firm Size
Based on knowledge accumulation (11), knowledge production (12) and optimal R&D investment
(17), firm f accumulates its knowledge in sector i according to
zif,t+1 = z
i
f,t +
∑
j∈J
[Aij
(
z¯itR
ij
1f,t
)α ((
1 + κijτ ij
)
zjf,t
)1−α
εijf,t + θA
ij
(
z¯itR
ij
2f,t
)α (
z¯jt
)1−α
]
= zif,t + I
i
f,t
∑
j∈J
Aij
(
z¯it
α
1− α
ωˆij
njt
)α ((
1 + κijτ ij
)
zjf,tε
ij
f,t + θz¯
j
t
)
.
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Dividing both sides by nit+1, we can write the dynamics of (normalized) firm size (z˜
i
f,t+1 =
zif,t+1/n
i
t+1) as
z˜if,t+1 =
nit
nit+1
zif,t
nit
+ Iift
nit
nit+1
∑
j∈J
(
1 + κijτ ij
)
zjf,t
njt
nj
ni
[
Aij
(
Aijαρvi
M i
) α
1−α
εijf,t
]
+Iift
nit
nit+1
∑
j∈J
θz¯jt
nit
[
Aij
(
Aijαρvi
M i
) α
1−α
]
=
1
g
z˜if,t + I
i
ft
∑
j∈J
(
1 + κijτ ij
)
z˜jf,t
1 + r
(1− α)vi
[
1− α
α
nj
ni
(Aijραvi)
1
1−α
(
M i
) α
α−1
]
εijf,t
+Iift
∑
j∈J
θ
M j
1 + r
(1− α)vi
[
1− α
α
nj
ni
(Aijραvi)
1
1−α
(
M i
) α
α−1
]
=

1
g
z˜if,t + I
i
ft
∑
j∈J
(
1 + κijτ ij
) (1 + r)ωˆij
(1− α)vi
εijf,tz˜
j
f,t

+ Iift∑
j∈J
θ
M j
(1 + r)ωˆij
(1− α)vi
.
Define ξij ≡ (1+r)ωˆ
ij
(1−α)vi
, and φijf,t(ε
ij
f,t) ≡
[
1{if i=j}
g + I
i
ft(1 + κ
ijτ ij)ξijεijf,t
]
, ψijf,t ≡ I
i
ftξ
ij , we can
rewrite the above equation as in (29):
z˜f,t+1 = Φf,t+1z˜f,t +Ψf,t+1b.
where z˜f,t ≡ (z˜
1
f,t, . . . , z˜
K
f,t)
′, the constant vector b ≡ (θ/M1, . . . , θ/MK)′.
As both Φf,t+1 and Ψf,t+1 depend on firm’s binary decision of whether to innovate in sector i
in period t (Iif,t(z˜f,t)), they themselves are function of z˜f,t. We can thus rewrite (29) as a recursive
process:
z˜f,t+1 = Γε(z˜f,t) = Φf,t+1(z˜f,t, εf,t, ζf,t, )z˜f,t +Ψf,t+1(ζf,t, z˜f,t)b. (B.6)
Since the right-hand side of (B.6) is not linear in z˜f,t, we cannot use the results of Kesten (1973).
Nonetheless, we can show that it is asymptotically linear, a result which allows us to apply Mirek
(2011)’s generalisation of Kesten (1973) under appropriate assumptions.
Assumption 1 Innovation shocks εijf,t are stochastic processes, independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) over time, across sector-pairs and across firms. Their cumulative density function
G(ε) is on bounded support (0, ε¯] and has a mean equal one.
Assumption 2 Let Φ¯f denote the matrix Φf in which I
i
f is always one, i.e. Φ¯f= [ϕ¯
ij
f ]i×j∈J×J ,
where ϕ¯ijf =
1{if i=j}
g +
(
1 + κ(τ ij)τ ij
)
ξijεijf . There exists κ ∈ (0, s∞) where s∞ = sup{s ∈ R+ :
E|Φ¯f |
s <∞}, such that
E(|Φ¯f |
κ) = 1. (B.7)
Moreover,
E(|Φ¯f |
κ| log |Φ¯f ||) <∞. (B.8)
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Here we show that the recursion process in firm dynamics (29) satisfies condition (H1) to H(7)
in Assumptions 1.6 and 1.7 of Mirek (2011). (H1) and (H2) require that the recursive process is
close to an affine recursion. (H3) to (H7) are standard moment conditions on the heavy tail that
also required as assumptions in Kesten (1973) and its later extensions.
Verification of Assumption 1.6 (Shape of the mappings) of Mirek (2011).
Let ǫ = (ε, ζ), and
Γǫ(z˜f,t) = Φf,t+1(z˜f,t)z˜f,t +Ψf,t+1(z˜f,t)b
For every s > 0, let
Γǫ,s(z˜f,t) = sΓǫ(
1
s
z˜f,t).
Γǫ,s are called dilatations of Γǫ. Let
Γ¯ǫ(z˜f,t) = lim
s→0
Γǫ,s(z˜f,t).
Then we have
Γ¯ǫ(z˜f,t) = lim
s→0
Γǫ,s(z˜f,t) = lim
s→0
sΓǫ(
1
s
z˜f,t) = Φ¯f,t+1z˜f,t, .
because 1s z˜f,t transforms firms into mega firms that have abundant knowledge stock and innovate
in all sectors (i.e. Iif,t(z˜f,t) = 1, ∀i) and lims→0 sΨf,t+1 = 0.
Let
Nε = |(Φ¯f −
1
g
IK×K)z˜f,t +Ξb|, (B.9)
where IK×K is a K × K identity matrix, Ξ = [ξ
ij ]K×K . That is Nε is the distance in terms of
z˜f,t+1 between the firms that innovate in all sectors and firms that are completely inactive in all
sectors. By design, we have
|Γǫ(z˜f,t)− Φ¯f,t+1z˜f,t| ≤ Nε, (B.10)
for ∀ z˜f,t, ε
ij
f,t, ζ
i
f,t. Hence, the Assumption 1.6 in Mirek (2011) is satisfied.
Verification of Assumption 1.7 (Moments condition for the heavy tail) of Mirek (2011)
Condition (H3) is satisfied because Φ¯f depends on {ε
ij
f,t}ij only, which is i.i.d. over time,
sector-pair and firms; and the support of εijf,t is closed due to Assumption 1. The non-arithmeticity
assumption in (H4) is satisfied since the support of εijf,t is an interval of real numbers. Assumption
2 directly guarantees (H5) and (H6). In addition, |Nε|
κ < ∞ because z˜f,t is bounded by one and
εijf,t is bounded by ε¯. Hence (H7) is satisfied too. Overall, the Assumption of 1.7 in Mirek (2011)
is satisfied.
Therefore, according to Theorem 1.8 of Mirek (2011), the (normalized) firm size distribution in
this economy converges to a stationary Pareto distribution:
1− F i(z) = Pr(z˜if > z) ∼ (
z
ki
)−µ
i
, (B.11)
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where the shape parameter is µi and the scale parameter is ki. ki is governed by the public knowl-
edge capital in this sector (i.e. newborn firm’s imitated varieties). Therefore, ki =
∑
j∈J ξ
ij θ
Mj
.
By definition, M iz¯i = ni. Together with the definition of ui in (23), we can derive an explicit
expression of the shape parameter based on
1 = M i
∫
f∈Fi
z˜if,tdF
i(z) =
µi
µi − 1
ki
=
µi
µi − 1
(1 + r)M i
(1− α)vi
∑
j∈J
θωˆij
M j
=
µi
µi − 1
1 + r
1− α
uiM i
vi
.
Rearranging the terms in the above equation yields
µi = (1−
1 + r
1− α
uiM i
vi
)−1.
Therefore, the Pareto shape parameter strictly increases in the ratio between the public knowledge
value per firm to private knowledge per firm, u
i
vi/M i
.
B.4 Sector-specific parameter values
Table A.4 lists the estimated values for sector-specific expenditure share, si, elasticity of substitution
σi, average fixed cost F i and the variance of the fixed cost shocks σiζ .
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Table A.4: Sector-specific Parameter Values
Sector SIC code Sector Name si F i σi σiζ
(×10−4) (×10−8)
1 20 Food And Kindred Products 13.09% 3.48 1.46 2.02
2 22 Textile Mill Products 1.95% 4.00 1.10 1.21
3 281 Industrial Inorganic Chemistry 0.79% 3.04 0.90 0.93
4 286 Industrial Organic Chemistry 2.70% 3.46 0.29 0.12
5 282 Plastics Materials And Synthetic-resins 1.66% 5.73 1.03 1.50
6 287 Agricultural Chemicals 0.64% 7.62 0.26 0.12
7 284 Soaps, Detergents, Cleaners,Perfumes, Cosmetics And Toiletries 1.38% 1.20 1.51 2.22
8 285 Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers, Enamels, And Allied Products 0.54% 5.00 0.68 0.61
9 289 Miscellaneous Chemical Products 0.74% 6.31 0.81 0.87
10 283 Drugs And Medicines 3.32% 3.03 0.17 0.04
11 13, 29 Petroleum And Natural Gas Extraction 7.33% 6.43 1.62 2.62
12 30 Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products 3.66% 4.10 0.17 0.05
13 32 Stone, Clay, Glass And Concrete Products 2.28% 1.88 0.28 0.09
14 331,332,3399, 3462 Primary Ferrous Products 2.63% 4.23 1.15 1.30
15 333-336, Primary And Secondary Non-Ferrous Metals 0.81% 1.50 1.02 1.08
339(exp 3399),3463
16 34(exp 3462,3463, 348) Fabricated Metal Products 5.60% 2.90 0.12 0.02
17 351 Engines And Turbines 0.70% 8.40 0.63 0.71
18 352 Farm And Garden Machinery And Equipment 0.58% 2.42 0.49 0.32
19 353 Construction, Mining And Material 1.22% 2.46 0.32 0.14
Handling Machinery And Equipment
20 354 Metal Working Machinery And Equipment 0.94% 1.80 0.52 0.37
21 357 Office Computing And Accounting Machines 1.44% 2.84 0.17 0.07
22 355 Special Industry Machinery, Except Metal Working 0.83% 1.89 0.19 0.06
23 356 General Industrial Machinery And Equipment 1.15% 7.98 0.13 0.04
24 358 Refrigeration And Service Industry Machinery 0.97% 2.25 0.34 0.19
25 359 Miscellaneous Machinery, Except Electrical 0.89% 6.18 0.70 0.69
26 361, 3825 Electrical Transmission And Distribution Equipment 0.64% 2.10 0.41 0.28
27 362 Electrical Industrial Apparatus 0.65% 2.21 0.33 0.16
28 363 Household Appliances 0.54% 1.40 0.81 0.86
29 364 Electrical Lighting And Wiring Equipment 0.63% 1.94 0.85 0.93
30 369 Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment And Supplies 0.65% 5.58 0.72 0.82
31 365 Radio And Television Receiving Equipment 0.29% 5.91 0.70 1.00
Except Communication Types
32 366-367 Electronic Components And Accessories 2.75% 3.81 0.10 0.03
And Communications Equipment
33 371 Motor Vehicles And Other Motor Vehicle Equipment 8.28% 4.90 0.43 0.28
34 376 Guided Missiles And Space Vehicles And Parts 0.59% 18.40 6.01 41.17
35 373 Ship And Boat Building And Repairing 0.43% 30.78 4.12 26.78
36 374 Railroad Equipment 0.20% 11.58 2.02 6.26
37 375 Motorcycles, Bicycles, And Parts 0.08% 2.50 1.58 3.84
38 379(exp 3795) Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment 0.23% 2.30 1.14 1.84
39 348, 3795 Ordinance Except Missiles 0.24% 2.12 2.21 5.81
40 372 Aircraft And Parts 2.91% 3.95 0.54 0.38
41 38(exp 3825) Professional And Scientific Instruments 3.65% 3.86 0.07 0.01
42 99 All Other Sic’s 19.40% 5.00 0.10 0.01
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B.5 The Collated Stationary BGP Equilibrium Conditions
This section describe the collated set of conditions for the stationary BGP equilibrium. The set of
parameters in the economy is
Θ = {Aij , vi, σi, si, a, b, θ, α, β, η, L, F i, σiζ , σε,M, }.
The list of equilibrium variables of interest are{
[vi, ui,M i,
ni
n1
]K , [ω
ij , ωˆij , τ ij , s˜ij ]K×K , ρ, g, r, PY
}
.
A stationary BGP equilibrium of this model is described by the following systems of equations:
vj =
1
1− ρ
(
siPY
σi
+
∑
i∈J
ωij),
ωij =
[
κ(τ ij) + κ′(τ ij)τ ij
]
ωˆij ,
τ ij =
1−
∫
H i(ϕif )z˜
j
fdf∫
H i(ϕif )z˜
j
fdf
,
s˜ij =
1
τ ij + 1
,
ωˆij =
nj
ni
1− α
α
(Aijαρvi)
1
1−α (M i)
α
α−1 ,
ui =
∑
j∈J
θωˆij
M j
,
(g − 1)(g)
α
1−α =
(
αβvi
M i
) α
1−α ∑
j∈J
(
Aij
) 1
1−α
[
s˜ij + κij(τ ij)(1− s˜ij) + θ
M i
M j
]
njt
nit
,
M it = M
∫
f∈F
H i(ϕif,t)dG
ϕ(ϕif,t),
1 = β(1 + r)g
(η−1)
∑
i
si
1−σi
ρ =
1
1 + r
1
g
,
L =
σi − 1
σi
PY +
∑
i∈J
[
αρ(g − 1)vi +M iF i
]
,
PY = L+ r
∑
i∈J
vi.
where ϕif,t =
∑
j∈J [1−κ(τ
ij)−κ′(τ ij)τ ij(τ ij+1)]ωˆij z˜jf,t+u
i is firm f ’s additional gain in innovating
in sector i, which depends on firm’s existing knowledge portfolio, z˜f,t. Unfortunately, we cannot
solve the equilibrium analytically using the above equations, as there is no closed form expressions
for the mass of innovating firms and Gϕ(ϕif ). We thus resort to simulation with a large number of
firms to explore the implications of the model.
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C Computational Appendix
C.1 Simulation Algorithm
This section explains the simulation procedure for replicating the firm-specific observations in Sec-
tion 5.4. As explained previously, we assume the economy is at steady state in 1997 and estimate
the model parameters based on observations of firms which filed for patent at least once during the
five year period of 1993-1997.
First, based on the values of g, τ ij , α, θ and vi estimated in Section 5.1, we construct estimates
for ui and ωˆij according to (23) and (18), respectively. We then populate the simulated economy
with N = 70, 000 firms and K = 42 sectors. The initial firm sizes in each sector are randomly
drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean one and standard deviation 10 in each sector.
The following process is then iterated until the (normalized) firm size distribution stabilizes in
each sector, which takes about 100 periods.
1. For each firm in each sector, we calculate the expected gain from innovating, ϕif,t, according
to (24), given the estimated ui and ωˆij and {z˜f,t}f from the last period.
2. Calculate the probability of innovation in sector i for each firm H i(ϕif,t), given {z˜f,t}f , the
GMM estimated F i, σiζ , and the other parameters.
3. Simulate the innovation decision indicator Iif,t using a binomial random variable generator
such that Iif,t equals one with the estimated probability H
i(ϕif,t).
4. For each firm, randomly draw an innovation shock (εijf,t) from a bounded Gamma distribution
with mean one and the estimated variance σε and upper bound ε¯ = 2. With the simulated
Iif,t from the last step, estimated model parameters and the innovation shock, we update the
relative firm size z˜if,t+1 of the next period according to the equilibrium firm dynamics in (29).
Specifically, if Iif,t = 1,
z˜if,t+1 =
K∑
j=1
φijf,t+1z˜
j
f,t + θ
K∑
j=1
(1 + r)ωˆij
(1− α)viM j
,
where
φijf,t+1 =
1{if i=j}
g
+
(
1 + κ(τ ij)τ ij
) (1 + r)ωˆij
(1− α)vi
εijf,t
Otherwise, Iif,t = 0, then
z˜if,t+1 =
z˜if,t
g
.
5. The updated set of {z˜f,t+1}f then enters the next period as the new initial normalized firm
sizes.
6. In simulation if firm f has been inactive for five consecutive periods in all sectors (i.e.
Πt+5τ=tΠ
K
i=1I
i
f,t = 0), this firm is treated as if it has exited the economy entirely. In the sixth
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period, we treat the firm as a successful newborn firm in at least one sector, with the entry
probability to i given by H
i(ui)
Πi(1−Hi(ui))
.30
C.2 Counterfactual Simulations Algorithm
In this counterfactual experiment, we change the average and variance of the idiosyncratic fixed
costs of conducting R&D, F i and σiζ , to examine their impact on the aggregate growth rate, firm
size distribution, firm co-patenting and cross-sector knowledge utilization.
The main difference between the simulation process in Appendix C.1 and the counterfactual
experiments is that with the counterfactual fixed costs distribution, the economy is operating in a
different steady state from what we observe in the data. Therefore, we need to first compute the
new steady state value of g,M i, ni, vi, τ ij , and then use the new parameter values to examine the
firm dynamics in (29).
The counterfactual simulation iterates through the following steps.
1. Guess an initial value of g,M i, ni, vi, τ ij ;
2. Simulate the firm dynamics according to (29) for T periods, which generates a new set of
M i, τ i;31
3. Bring the new M i, τ i to equations (14) and (B.2) and run GMM to solve for new value of
vi, ni, g. We apply the Perron-Frobenius Theorem to solve for the systems of equations in
(B.2), where the new steady state (g − 1)g
1
1−α is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix Ag in
(C.1) and n is the corresponding eigenvector. Meanwhile, (14) gives the new steady state
value of vi.
(g − 1)g
1
1−αn = Agn, (C.1)
where
Aijg = (
αβvi
M i
)
α
1−α (Aij)
1
1−α δij . (C.2)
4. When the initial and new values of g,M i, ni, vi, τ ij do not converge, set the new value of
g,M i, ni, vi, τ ij as initial guess and go back to 1; otherwise exit the loop.
30In the patent data, when a firm has been inactive for five periods, its likelihood of resuming patenting is almost
zero. In the estimated model, such firms still collect knowledge licensing fees, but are unlikely to resume R&D,
because the estimated c.d.f. of the Gamma distribution Hi(ϕif,t) is flat and almost zero when ϕ
i
f,t is close to zero
given our estimated values of F i and σiζ . Therefore, treating the persistently inactive firms in the simulation as
newborn firms is sensible, as these firms behave almost the same as new entrants in terms of their entry decision and
innovation outcome.
31The simulation does generate a new set of g, ni, but due to the granularity with finite number of firms, volatile
R&D shocks and fixed cost shocks, g, ni fluctuate too much over different periods, while M i, τ i depends on the
distributions of z˜f,t, which are relatively stable. That is why we take M
i, τ i from the simulation, but not g, ni.
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